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CHARITIES IN POLITICS: A REAPPRAISAL
BRIAN GALLE*
ABSTRACT
Federal law significantly limits the political activities of charities,
but no one really knows why. In the wake of Citizens United, the
absence of any strong normative grounding for the limits may leave
the rules vulnerable to constitutional challenge. This Article steps
into that breach, offering a set of policy reasons to separate politics
from charity. I also sketch ways in which my more precise exposition
of the rationale for the limits helps guide interpretation of the com-
plex legal rules implementing them. 
Any defense of the political limits begins with significant chal-
lenges because of a long tradition of scholarly criticism of them.
Critics of the limits suggest that the “market failures” that justify tax
subsidies for charity also afflict group efforts to monitor politicians
and organize politically, and thus the subsidy should extend to cover
those activities. These claims, though, overlook a series of additional
issues suggested by transaction cost economics and other aspects of
economic theory. 
Most significantly, even if lobbying and electioneering should be
subsidized, it does not follow that these functions should be carried
out by charities. I argue that combining politics with charity may
produce a set of diseconomies of scope, including higher agency costs,
diminished “warm glow” from giving, and greater inframarginality
of deduction recipients. In addition, I argue that the economically
ideal tools for reaching the socially optimal levels of charity and
lobbying are incompatible with one another. Although there are also
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offsetting gains from the combination, many of these gains further
exacerbate the diseconomies. 
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INTRODUCTION
As the Supreme Court has deregulated campaign finance over the
past few years, money has poured into every crevice of politics, but
maybe nowhere more so than in the nonprofit sector.1 Most of the
notorious “Super PACs,” including Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS, are
organized as nonprofits.2 Federal tax law in theory prevents most
nonprofits from devoting the bulk of their efforts to political cam-
paigns and also limits the lobbying efforts of true charities, such as
hospitals, schools, and churches.3 But now that the Court has
declared the pool open, even church leaders are diving in, with a
coalition of ministers frankly daring the IRS to attempt to enforce
its rules against them.4 
Should we care? That is the central question for this Article.
Legal limits on lobbying by charities have been around for a long
time, but truly thorough explanations for why they exist have been
slow to develop.5 For about forty years, that was a problem mostly
for academics, and perhaps for Congress. 
Now, though, Citizens United v. FEC and the rest of the dereg-
ulatory wave of campaign finance decisions lend new urgency to
identifying the government’s interest in regulating the political
activities of charities.6 Under federal tax law, charities cannot en-
gage in more than a “substantial” amount of lobbying and cannot
take part in campaigns for elective office at all.7 The constitutional-
1. See Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt
Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 363-64 (2011). For a description
of the deregulatory movement, see Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the
Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 195-97 (2012).
2. Michael Luo & Stephanie Strom, Donor Names Remain Secret as Rules Shift, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, at A1; Jonathan Weisman, Scrutiny of Political Nonprofits Sets Off
Claim of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2012, at A20.
3. David C. Vladeck, Special Considerations for Lobbying by Nonprofit Corporations, in
THE LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS AND
LOBBYISTS 319, 321-33 (William V. Luneberg & Thomas M. Susman eds., 3d ed. 2005).
4. See Stephanie Strom, The Political Pulpit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at B1.
5. See Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and
Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 911-15 (2011). 
6. See id. at 873; see also 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
7. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
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ity of the two limits had been mostly settled by a series of Court
decisions in the early 1980s.8 Because government was not obliged
to fund speech, the Court held, Congress could—with little justifica-
tion or explanation—make abstention from politics a condition of its
subsidies for the charitable sector.9
Those cases, however, depend on the assumption that a charity’s
stakeholders can still express themselves through the use of an af-
filiated, noncharitable nonprofit entity.10 The Citizens United Court
rejected, albeit in a somewhat different context, a very similar argu-
ment: the government had claimed that Citizens United was not
burdened by campaign expenditure limits, because it could miti-
gate those limits by establishing a separate PAC.11 The Court
waived aside that alternative as too burdensome to sidestep First
Amendment scrutiny.12 And strict scrutiny, of course, demands that
the government offer a compelling interest in support of its regula-
tion.
Many other authors have also written on the connection between
charity and politics, and in any literature as crowded as this one,
any new contribution is necessarily incremental.13 But prior authors
have overlooked some fundamental economic concepts. For example,
8. Galston, supra note 5, at 891-97.
9. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983).
10. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
11. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897. 
12. See id. at 897-98.
13. Important articles in the literature include the following: Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the
Ban on Participation in Political Campaigns by Charities Essential to Their Vitality and
Democracy? A Reply to Professor Tobin, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1057 (2008); Bruce Chapman,
Between Markets and Politics: A Social Choice Theoretic Appreciation of the Charitable Sector,
6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 821 (1998); Laura B. Chisholm, Exempt Organization Advocacy:
Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201 (1988) [hereinafter Chisholm,
Matching]; Laura Brown Chisholm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308 (1990) [hereinafter Chisolm, Politics and Charity]; Miriam
Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code's Treatment
of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269 (1993); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith?
Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2001); Oliver A. Houck,
On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Politics by Charitable
Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1
(2003); Benjamin M. Leff, “Sit Down and Count the Cost”: A Framework for Constitutionally
Enforcing the 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 673 (2009); Donald B.
Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous
for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313 (2007).
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critics of existing political limits suggest that lobbying, at least, is
consistent with the goals of the charitable contribution deduction.14
The standard economic explanation for the deduction, though, is to
encourage the production of goods the private market would other-
wise fail to deliver.15 To be sure, lobbying can be a tool for delivering
services to the needy. But that implies that lobbying should be
limited to lobbying in favor of delivering new public goods, not
blocking or repealing them. This is a considerable oversight, given
that political economists believe that the vast majority of effective
lobbying is aimed at obstructing new legislation or regulation.16 
Another gap that would surprise an organizational economist is
the absence of any analysis of economies of scale and scope. Some
opponents of the political limitations suggest plausibly that market
failures also afflict efforts for underrepresented communities to
unite for mutual political benefit.17 Perhaps, then, lobbying should
also be subsidized. Should the two tasks, lobbying and charity, be
conducted together in the same organization, though? Are the two
more effective when combined, or are there instead ways in which
one might undermine the other? That seems like a key question,
and so far it has gone unasked. Answering it will form the core of
my analysis. 
There are other omissions as well. Political scientists have al-
ready debated the best design for political subsidies.18 The charita-
ble contribution deduction, which is more generous for wealthier
interests and allows for unlimited spending, is exactly the type of
14. See Buckles, supra note 13, at 1115-16; Chisholm, Matching, supra note 13, at 267,
270-73; Houck, supra note 13, at 84; Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 61 (2011); John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable
Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 286 (Walter W.
Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
15. See JOHN D. COLUMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 104-07
(1995); Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rogers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable
Contributions, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND
POLICY 224, 231-32 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986).
16. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 13, at 1115-16; Mark Chaves et al., Does Government
Funding Suppress Nonprofits’ Political Activity?, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 292, 293 (2004); Chisholm,
Matching, supra note 13, at 266-77; Galston, supra note 13, at 1314.
18. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 20-35 (1996); see id. at 20-
21 n.88 (describing earlier proposals of political scientists).
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design that all the otherwise fractious political scientists can agree
they would reject.19 The finance and organizational-theory litera-
tures offer a rich account of the perils of organizations that try to
conduct two unrelated tasks at the same time: higher agency costs
and managerial distraction are usually the result.20
In sum, there are potentially two distinct questions about the
legal separation between charity and politics. First, should we sub-
sidize political activity? If not, then we have an easy answer: the
limits are simply targeting rules for government dollars, albeit with
some potentially tricky questions about how to implement that
targeting. Supposing that politics should sometimes get government
support—and arguably it should—we then have the question of how
to deliver that additional subsidy. This design problem, I will argue,
is probably what best justifies the existing rules.21 
As for the remainder of the Article, Part I offers more detailed
background for readers not familiar with the tax rules governing
charity or the constitutional law bearing on the validity of those
rules. Part II begins the analysis by examining whether the ration-
ales usually offered for government subsidies, such as in the case of
the charitable contribution deduction, also justify a subsidy for
lobbying, a subset of political activities. Although I find that these
rationales offer less support than critics of the limits have acknowl-
edged, the rationales do argue for subsidies at least for some people
to engage in some kinds of lobbying. Part III therefore takes up the
design question, asking whether charity and politics are wisely
conducted together. Part IV plays out the legal implications of Parts
II and III, offering suggested definitions of “lobbying” and “substan-
tial,” and addressing other questions that currently vex lawyers in
the field. Part V briefly applies the lessons of Parts II and III to
charitable involvement in campaigns for elective office. 
19. See id. at 29-30.
20. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 33-43 (1991)
(agency costs); Sucheta Nadkarni & Pamela S. Barr, Environmental Context, Managerial
Cognition, and Strategic Action: An Integrated View, 29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1395, 1397-1419
(2008) (distraction).
21. See infra Part III.
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I. BACKGROUND
To understand political limits on nonprofits, the reader must
unfortunately take a brief tour of tax law. Federally recognized
nonprofits can earn two distinct forms of tax benefits. Noncharitable
nonprofits, such as labor unions and cooperatives, are exempt from
the federal tax on corporate income.22 Organizations meeting the
tougher standards of § 501(c)(3), which I will somewhat loosely
group together as “charities,” are entitled to this exemption and also
are eligible to receive deductible contributions.23 That is, individuals
who donate to a qualified 501(c)(3) can reduce their taxable income
by the amount of the contribution, subject to a series of technical
limitations.24 
The dollar value of this charitable contribution deduction (“the
deduction”) is only a fraction of the money donated. Reducing tax-
able income by one dollar shrinks the size of the check the taxpayer
has to write to the government in an amount equal to the taxpayer’s
marginal rate multiplied by one dollar.25 So, for example, if Louise
makes a $1,000 contribution and has a 28 percent marginal tax rate,
she now pays the government $280 less in taxes. In effect, the de-
duction is a matching grant from the government to the charity: for
every dollar the donor contributes, the government gives back, say,
28 or 35 cents, which the donor can then also contribute. Studies
suggest that the deduction is an important factor in encouraging
donations.26
Because of its structure as an income tax deduction, federal sup-
port for charity is worth more for higher-income donors.27 We have
a progressive tax system, so higher-bracket donors get a larger
matching grant.28 Only itemizers, who are generally higher-income
22. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)-(7) (2006).
23. See id. § 501(c)(3); see also id. § 170(a)(1).
24. For a thorough exploration of the contribution rules, see BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ch. 25 (3d ed. 2002).
25. See COLUMBO & HALL, supra note 15, at 107-08.
26. See John Peloza & Piers Steel, The Price Elasticities of Charitable Contributions: A
Meta-Analysis, 24 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 260, 264-65 & tbl.1, 267 (2005). 
27. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 136 (1973).
28. See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 24, at 25-2.
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households,29 can claim the deduction at all,30 and donors must have
enough taxable income within a five-year span to offset their con-
tributions.31 
To qualify for their matching grant, nonprofit firms have to meet
a series of legal requirements, including two separate limits on their
political activities. For one, the organizations cannot engage in a
“substantial” amount of “propaganda ... or otherwise attempt[ ] to
influence legislation.”32 I will call this the “lobbying limitation.” The
organization also must not “participate in ... any political campaign
on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”33
Notice the absence of the word “substantial” in this phrase. I will
call this second rule the “electioneering ban.” 
The other legal requirements for the deduction deal mostly with
defining what kinds of firms are eligible for the subsidy. Generally
speaking, commercial enterprises are not eligible, but churches,
educational institutions, nonprofit hospitals, museums, zoos, and
social service organizations are.34 The key feature these purposes all
share is that they suffer from market failure: because their con-
sumers provide positive externalities to others, the private market
will tend to undersupply them.35 Entities that meet most of these
requirements, but fail to comply with all of the political restrictions,
can still be exempt from the corporate income tax under
§ 501(c)(4).36 A (c)(4) can lobby and electioneer as long as election-
eering is not the primary purpose of the organization.37
Taxpayers have repeatedly, and so far unsuccessfully, challenged
the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)’s political limitations.38 The
29. Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C.
L. REV. 843, 843-46 (2001).
30. I.R.C. § 63 (2006).
31. Id. § 170(d).
32. Id. § 501(c)(3). Nonchurch charities can also opt into a more detailed set of rules with
explicit caps on certain forms of lobbying expenditures and more complex, although not
necessarily more precise, definitions of several important terms. Id. § 501(h).
33. Id. § 501(c)(3).
34. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2012); ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, PLANNING TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS §§ 7.01, .05, .08, 8.01 (2012).
35. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 163 (9th ed. 2007).
36. See DESIDERIO, supra note 34, § 23.02(5)(c).
37. Vladeck, supra note 3, at 321.
38. In other words, the reader may now uncover her eyes: our journey through tax land
is over. Okay, almost over. 
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leading case is still Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington, or “TWR.”39 The TWR Court held that the deduction is
a subsidy for charity and that the government is free to withhold
that subsidy from activities it would prefer not to underwrite.40 The
Court declared that there is no right to government support even for
constitutionally protected activities such as political speech.41 
In cases after TWR, though, the Court grew more willing to scru-
tinize government spending decisions. Justice Blackmun’s concur-
ring opinion in TWR had argued that a complete ban on all speech
by a recipient organization went beyond the government’s goal of
simply limiting the uses of its own dollars, because the ban also ef-
fectively penalized the organization for speech paid for with money
that came from elsewhere.42 Later cases adopted Blackmun’s con-
currence as the more persuasive approach.43 If a government
grant is conditioned on limits to the recipient entity’s speech, the
recipient’s members must have some other outlet for their ex-
pression.44 In the case of nonprofits, the TWR concurrence ac-
knowledged, this condition is usually met, because a 501(c)(3)
organization is free to form an affiliated (c)(4), which its members
can then use to do the bulk of their lobbying.45 
Thus, until recently it seemed fairly settled that the lobbying
limits and electioneering ban were constitutional, even though they
arguably burdened protected speech, because of the (c)(4) option.46
Many charities now also operate an affiliated noncharitable
nonprofit which they use to conduct their political operations.47 
39. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
40. Id. at 544-45.
41. Id. at 545-46.
42. Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
43. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364, 400 (1984). For an overview of rules limiting government decisions to fund speech,
see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1919, 1928-38 (2006).
44. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-400.
45. TWR, 461 U.S. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
46. See Galston, supra note 5, at 891-97, 903-06.
47. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 204; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That
We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 546-47 (2008). For a helpful case
study of these multientity structures, see Janelle A. Kerlin & Elizabeth J. Reid, The
Financing and Programming of Advocacy in Complex Nonprofit Structures, 39 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 802, 806-12 (2010).
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The now-infamous Citizens United decision and a handful of cases
immediately before and after it have unsettled the consensus that
TWR remains good law.48 The Supreme Court and courts of appeals
have now struck down a series of state and federal limits on political
expenditures.49 The exact contours of the rules that have been inval-
idated are not important for my purposes here, but the rationale the
courts have offered is. In Citizens United, for example, the Supreme
Court struck down federal limits on certain political advertising
paid for out of a corporation’s general treasury funds.50 The gove-
rnment argued in defense of the limits that corporations could still
form a separately incorporated political action committee, or “PAC,”
which they could then use as vehicles for whatever advertising they
wanted.51 The Court rejected that argument, stating, 
Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak—and
it does not—the option to form PACs does not alleviate the First
Amendment problems with [the advertising limits]. PACs are
burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and
subject to extensive regulations. For example, every PAC must
appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the treasurer
promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons
making donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an
organization statement and report changes to this information
within 10 days....
...PACs have to comply with these regulations just to speak....
PACs, furthermore, must exist before they can speak. Given the
onerous restrictions, a corporation may not be able to establish
a PAC in time to make its views known regarding candidates
and issues in a current campaign.... 
[The] prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is
thus a ban on speech.52
48. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). For the full story, see
Aprill, supra note 1, at 365-75, 391-401, and Galston, supra note 5, at 882-84.
49. Hasen, supra note 1, at 213-16.
50. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
51. Supplemental Reply Brief for the Appellee at 6, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No.
08-205).
52. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897-98.
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In other words, it appears that the burdens of setting up an alter-
native entity to speak for the organization can themselves create “a
ban on speech.”
Commentators have been quick to point out the possible implica-
tions of passages like these for the TWR consensus.53 Setting up a
(c)(4) organization, like creating a PAC, requires an application form
and regular reporting to the government.54 Establishing that none
of the 501(c)(3) entity’s resources are funneled to the (c)(4) requires
detailed and careful accounting. If the logic of Citizens United
applies, then the effort of setting up a (c)(4) workaround looks as
though it could itself be a “ban” on speech.55
Of course, the fact that government regulations burden or ban
speech does not necessarily mean that they are unconstitutional.
Government always has the opportunity, even under the strictest
constitutional scrutiny, to show that it is pursuing a compelling
interest with the least restrictive means available.56 Thus, the
government’s interest in the 501(c)(3) political limits may be the key
factor distinguishing the limits from those considered by Citizens
United and its ilk. In Citizens United, the government’s goals were
purely regulatory: it wanted to control the market for politics to
avoid “corruption.”57 The rationale for the political limits on char-
ities may be different. Most of the existing explanations for those
limits center on protecting the government’s investment in charity.58
Understanding charity, then, is at the center of the constitutional
inquiry into the political limits placed on it. In what ways might
lobbying or electioneering interfere with the underlying goals of
53. See Aprill, supra note 1, at 391-401; Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities
in the Face of Citizens United: A Defense of Prohibition, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 721-23
(2012); Galston, supra note 5, at 903-11; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying:
Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407, 414-26 (2011); see
also Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1259-60
(1999) (noting potential conflict of TWR and election law precedents prior to Citizens United).
54. I.R.C. § 6033(a) (2006); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6033-2 (2012). 
55. Mayer, supra note 53, at 416-18, 423. But see Aprill, supra note 1, at 397-98
(suggesting that burdens of § 501(c) are lighter than the PAC regime condemned in Citizens
United); Galston, supra note 5, at 907-11 (arguing that other case law may provide a basis for
distinguishing Citizens United).
56. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
57. Id. at 903.
58. Cf. id. at 899 (noting that the Court has allowed restrictions on speech to permit
proper functioning of government institutions).
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§ 501? That is the issue I will explore for the remainder of this
Article.
II. PRESERVING THE GOVERNMENT’S MONEY?
With that background out of the way, I turn now to attempting to
determine whether there are any good explanations for the lobbying
limits.59 One obvious potential justification is that politics could be
a wasteful diversion of charitable dollars. The charitable contribu-
tion deduction serves as a subsidy for charities, and tax exemption
may further subsidize some organizations.60 Perhaps limits on
lobbying are simply ways for the government to channel those sub-
sidies to their desired purposes. For any government-purpose
analysis to be coherent, of course, we first have to agree on what
purposes the deduction might be furthering. That is itself somewhat
controversial. Thus the Sections that follow each lay out a possible
set of rationales for the deduction and then consider whether
lobbying activity is consistent with those justifications.
A. Government Failure and Diversity Rationales
By far the most common modern justifications for the deduction
rest on the claim that it helps society to produce goods that neither
the market nor majoritarian government could.61 Markets can fail
to satisfy social demand for “public goods,” or other goods with a sig-
nificant positive externality attached, because potential buyers do
59. By “lobbying,” I mean efforts to achieve outcomes through political rather than private
means.
60. Jeff Strnad, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis, in
THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY, supra note
15, at 265, 273. Dan Halperin explains that an exemption is a subsidy to the extent that the
organization would not be able to offset all its revenues with deductions in the future. See
Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283, 285,
292-94 (2011). Because political expenditures are not deductible business expenses, I.R.C.
§ 162(e) (2006), exempt entities are receiving a subsidy in the amount of lobbying and any
untaxed campaign expenditures. Cf. id. § 527 (imposing a tax on exempt-entity expenditures
related to electioneering activities, but only to the extent of an organization’s net investment
income).
61. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 257-59
(2007).
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not take into account the benefit their purchase would provide to
others.62 For-profit firms may also struggle to sell “credence” goods,
whose quality is difficult for the purchaser to monitor; by promising
not to divert profits, the nonprofit firm can help reassure consumers
that it will not cheat them in order to pad the bottom line.63
Although governments can use their taxing power to fill these gaps,
government production might be limited to the policies that can
command the support of a majority of the voting public.64 The
argument therefore is that government, too, fails to meet the needs
of novel or unpopular causes, or of voters with unusually high
demand for a service that the average voter desires in only modest
amounts.65
Debate over whether this rationale is consistent with nonprofit
lobbying has so far amounted to a fairly simple back-and-forth.
Critics of lobbying by charities suggest that, because lobbying is not
the production of services the market has failed to offer, use of sub-
sidized charitable dollars for that purpose misallocates the govern-
ment’s dollars.66 Supporters respond that lobbying is simply an
alternative way of getting society to create the underprovided
goods.67 They also argue that advocacy on behalf of those with few
resources or political influence is itself a form of public good.68 They
62. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV.
1393, 1397-98 (1988).
63. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 68-70 (1981) (“With a nonprofit producer ... the
patron has some assurance, by virtue of the nondistribution constraint, that all of the funds
he turns over to the firm will in fact be used to produce the services that the firm holds itself
out as providing.”).
64. See Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a
Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171, 175-83 (Edmund
S. Phelps ed., 1975).
65. John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System, in THE
ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY, supra note 15,
at 246, 253-54; Weisbrod, supra note 64, at 175-78 & fig.1.
66. Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate—Never the Twain Shall
Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 35, 80 (2003); see Leff, supra note 13, at 676 (summarizing this
argument); see also Chapman, supra note 13, at 865 (claiming that lobbying by charities
would exacerbate the political conflicts that the deduction is supposed to resolve).
67. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
68. See Chisholm, Matching, supra note 13, at 266-77; Houck, supra note 13, at 84; see
also Kelly LeRoux, Nonprofits as Civic Intermediaries: The Role of Community-Based
Organizations in Promoting Political Participation, 42 URB. AFF. REV. 410, 411-12 (2007)
(noting this point but not explicitly connecting it to the legal debate over the scope of lobbying
2013] CHARITIES IN POLITICS 1575
further claim that including these forgotten voices in the political
conversation can transform the debate, which is perhaps yet
another common benefit we all would enjoy.69 
The combatants have not yet recognized, however, that each of
these three counterclaims rests on factual assumptions that may not
be well grounded. Increased lobbying expenditures might not in fact
lead to greater social production of the goods sought. Advocacy may
not actually improve the lives of the underrepresented. And sub-
sidies for charity might not change the political climate or, if they
do, might not change it for the better. Each of these possibilities
needs some unpacking.
1. “Get Stuff”
Consider first the claim that lobbying might be another way to
encourage production of goods that the market and government
would otherwise fail to provide. A preliminary problem with this
theory is that it does not really support many forms of lobbying
activity. The theory, which I will call the “get stuff” premise, implies
very significant restrictions on the permissible subjects charities
could lobby for. A large fraction of U.S. lobbying expenditures are
“defensive”—they are devoted to preventing changes to existing
law.70 Perhaps preserving an existing entitlement program is
another way of ensuring that the program’s benefits continue to
exist. Many other kinds of defensive lobbying, however, such as
NIMBY-ish efforts to block or relocate a proposed public works
project, opposition to new regulations of industry or human be-
havior, or calls for government austerity, could not plausibly rely
on the “get stuff” theory. Similarly, efforts to repeal existing regu-
restrictions). See generally JEFFREY M. BERRY WITH DAVID F. ARONS, A VOICE FOR NONPROFITS
(2003) (developing an argument about the need for and role of the voluntary sector as an
advocate for disenfranchised interests). As the advocates recognize, this rationale would not
apply to private foundations. See Chisholm, Matching, supra note 13, at 285.
69. See NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT 122
(2011); Chisholm, Politics and Charity, supra note 13, at 349; Garnett, supra note 13, at 800-
01; J. Craig Jenkins, Nonprofit Organizations and Political Advocacy, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 307, 325; Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics
and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of
Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875, 883-84 (2001).
70. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO
LOSES, AND WHY 233 & tbl.11.6 (2009).
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lations, or to cut taxes or services, would seem the exact opposite of
a “get stuff” rationale. Of course any lobbying for the production of
“private” goods that the market could produce—which, by some
accounts, is the bulk of all lobbying71—would fall outside the
charitable-support framework entirely. Proponents of a “get stuff”-
type argument have so far not acknowledged these logical limits on
their position.72 
Assuming that lobbying funds were spent on goals consistent with
the purpose of the deduction, it is still unclear to what extent such
expenditures would actually increase production of the goods
sought. Injecting new funds into the system may simply contribute
to an arms race in which all the actors spend more but do not get
better results.73 Further, it is likely that at least some portion of a
lobbying subsidy would be captured as “rents” for public officials
and professional lobbyists.74 Political economists argue that the
time, attention, and agenda space of public officials is limited.75
Those who seek access must bid against each other, allowing the
official to extract rents as payments for the opportunity to move up
in line.76 Intermediaries with relational capital invested in ongoing
ties with officials may help provide access, but they, too, may claim
rents in exchange for the scarce resource of their leverage with their
71. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 132-33 (1971).
72. Arguably, existing rules preventing charitable resources from being spent for the
“private inurement” of a nonprofit’s insiders or for the “private benefit” of outsiders might
limit lobbying for the production of private goods. Buckles, supra note 13, at 1120-21 & n.277.
But, as Buckles acknowledges, these rules are nearly impossible for the government to invoke
successfully in the lobbying context, because there will almost always be some colorable
public-regarding purpose for any lobbying effort. See id. at 1121-22.
73. Shi-Ling Hsu, What Is a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign
Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L. REV. 75, 109-11 (2005); Daryl J. Levinson, Market Failures and
Failures of Markets, 85 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1747-48 (1999).
74. “Rent seeking is the socially costly pursuit of wealth transfers.” Robert D. Tollison,
Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 506, 506 (Dennis C. Mueller
ed., 1997).
75. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 42-44; see Hasen, supra note 1, at 219 (noting
the critical role of personal contact in successful lobbying efforts).
76. See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
POLITICAL EXTORTION 124-31 (1997).
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allies in office.77 Helping groups to organize may simply facilitate
the process of rent extraction.78
Funds devoted to lobbying may also be particularly vulnerable to
diversion by a charity’s own officers and employees. Commentators
have recognized that, due to the difficulty of monitoring the quality
of most public goods and the weak legal oversight mechanisms for
most charities, it can be relatively easy for their employees to
exploit the organization’s resources for the employees’ own ends.79
Officers may pay themselves generous salaries, give only indifferent
effort, or pursue purposes that satisfy their own preferences rather
than those of donors. 
These problems are more acute in the lobbying context because of
a form of the team-production problem. When many actors collabo-
rate together, it is difficult for monitors to judge each of their
individual contributions.80 Knowing this, participants may each feel
free to pursue their own goals. Any lobbying to “get stuff” necessar-
ily involves multiple actors—the charity’s employees, the officials,
the charity’s outside lobbyists, and often a coalition of allied
organizations.81 Employees may take money to lobby and, when
undesired outcomes occur, simply blame the officials. Or they may
take money to “lobby” for an outcome that would have happened
anyway. 
More generally, as I have argued previously, lobbying is a costlier
method of producing public goods than direct production by a
charity, because it requires the efforts of two separate sets of
agents.82 We have just seen that when donors give money to a
charity to produce a public good, some portion of their money and
time will be lost to efforts at monitoring the charity’s employees.
77. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 219, 223 (describing the source of lobbyists’ long-term
influence); Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1627, 1652-53 (1999).
78. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 76, at 151-52.
79. See Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations,
1999 WIS. L. REV. 227, 234-36; Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social
Cost of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 859-60 (2003). 
80. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 325 (1982).
81. See Thomas T. Holyoke, Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation, 53 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 360, 362-74 (2009) (reporting that working with legislators and coalition partners
moves organizational lobbyists away from positions preferred by their group’s members).
82. Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777,
805-06 (2012).
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Unless monitoring and control mechanisms are perfectly effective,
some additional fraction is lost in rents paid to the charitable
entrepreneurs.83 If the charity is tasked with lobbying, then this
process repeats again, as the charity’s employees contract with
second or even third sets of agents in the form of outside lobbyists
and public officials. 
Moreover, lobbyists and government officials may exploit
nonprofit firms’ vulnerability to holdups. For-profit firms are rela-
tively resistant to managers who may be tempted to exploit the
firm’s dependence on them by demanding extra portions of the
profits, because the size of these demands is limited to the firm’s
cost of replacing the manager.84 Most shareholders can also respond
to holdup attempts by simply selling their stock.85 In contrast, many
nonprofit stakeholders have deep and lifelong ties to their
institution—say, the university’s name on their resume.86 These
stakeholders can likely be repeatedly shaken down for rents by
public officials who fund the institution or its mission, or by
intermediaries who help to secure that funding.87 
Even if all these various potential diversions do not wholly
consume the value of the government’s subsidy, they might still
represent a reason to limit lobbying. If lobbying activities lead to a
greater degree of waste and diversion than other methods for
“getting stuff,” limiting them could be a way to enhance the cost
effectiveness of the government’s dollars. 
2. Interest Representation
Another way of justifying lobbying within a government failure
framework for charity is to claim that the act of presenting the
underserved groups’ claims to government is itself one of the public
83. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-36 (1982).
84. Cf. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
599 (1992).
85. See Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 77, at 1653-54 & n.85.
86. See Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1019, 1045 (2011) (noting that donors are tied to nonprofits by moral commitment,
geography, and social incentives).
87. The nonprofit sector as a whole faces this problem with respect to § 170. See, e.g.,
Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy: “Rent-Seeking”
Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 971, 1003-31.
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goods society fails to provide.88 Importantly, this vision of lobbying
would seem to avoid both of my criticisms of the “get stuff” ap-
proach. For one, it would logically embrace a much wider set of
permissible lobbying topics, such as defensive lobbying or efforts to
repeal existing government programs, so long as the goals repre-
sented the interests of a group that would otherwise be unable to
find purchase in the scramble for political influence. Representing
the interests of others also might be a justifiable target for govern-
ment subsidies even if lobbying dollars are relatively easily di-
verted. Because lobbying is itself the goal, the government can point
to no alternative, more cost-effective method as a preferred target
of its funds. 
The interest representation theory relies on significant additional
factual assumptions, however. For one, it is unclear that minority
interests would be voiceless in the absence of a subsidy. As most
readers likely know, public choice theory predicts that small and
concentrated interests are exactly those that are most likely to
succeed politically.89 Even groups with few resources of their own
can attract policy entrepreneurs to represent them, on the expecta-
tion that successful lobbying will bring later rewards for the
entrepreneur.90 Indeed, this argument would seem to undermine the
premises of the government failure rationale for the deduction itself,
as I have explained elsewhere.91 Nonetheless, there would still be
some groups—especially those that are poor, fairly numerous, and
widespread—for whom public choice theory would suggest that
subsidies might be needed, whether for lobbying or direct production
of other public goods they prefer.92
Another question for the interest representation argument is
whether it can remain coherent if lobbying is permitted by most
charities. Again, it is widely accepted that access to public officials
is limited.93 Some, but likely not all, underrepresented interests will
88. For accounts of lobbying as a public good outside the nonprofit context, see Issacharoff
& Ortiz, supra note 77, at 1668.
89. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 23-24 & n.52 (1991).
90. KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 72-74 (1986).
91. Galle, supra note 82, at 804.
92. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 226-27.
93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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be able to attract charitable organizations to fight on their behalf.94
Subsidies for represented groups may bid up the cost of access to
officials, meaning that it will become even more costly for groups
that do not have representation.95 Subsidized lobbying might
therefore amplify some voices by drowning out others. These new
outsiders are already likely to be especially marginal, given their
inability to draw even private policy entrepreneurs into their corner. 
Similarly, a lobbying deduction might simply amplify existing
disparities in resources and influence.96 Wealthy and powerful
donors, too, can form organizations to lobby on their own behalf.
And the current structure of the deduction provides much greater
benefits to top-bracket donors than to the bottom 50 percent of
households, magnifying, rather than narrowing, disparities in the
groups’ political access.97 Better-financed interests could also use
these additional resources to bid up the costs of access, further
reducing the access of poorer groups. 
For these reasons, commentators weighing the design of a pos-
sible lobbying subsidy overwhelmingly favor vouchers or other
rewards that are identical in size for each individual, rather than a
matching grant.98 Even if crowding out is not a problem, the pos-
sibility that already-successful interests could claim the deduction
94. See THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT
IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 211-15 (2003) (arguing that modern interest groups “privilege the
already-educated and already-politicized”); Hasen, supra note 18, at 30 (suggesting that
voucher systems might advantage better-organized and wealthier groups); Jennifer E. Mosley,
Organizational Resources and Environmental Incentives: Understanding the Policy Advocacy
Involvement of Human Service Nonprofits, 84 SOC. SERV. REV. 57, 72 (2010) (finding survey
evidence that “small, isolated organizations” are not successful at lobbying and that this
disparity may diminish the “diversity of voices advocating for clients”).
95. Cf. Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 77, at 1658 (observing that groups that can afford
more effective lobbyists will become yet more powerful than those with weak representatives).
96. For arguments why this would be undesirable, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 327-30 (1993); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional
Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1220-50 (1994).
97. Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on Section 527 Organizations, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1776-78 (2007) (offering this as a reason the tax system limits lobbying
with deductible dollars); see Galston, supra note 13, at 1317. It is also possible that wealthier
interests will not significantly increase their lobbying in response to the subsidy. But they will
surely claim the deduction anyway, meaning the government will spend money for nothing.
98. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Ballot Propositions and Campaign Finance Reform, 1
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 63-67 (1997); Hasen, supra note 18, at 29-31; Spencer
Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 73, 106-08 (2004). 
2013] CHARITIES IN POLITICS 1581
means that the deduction would not be a very cost-effective support
for the underserved; only a small fraction of each dollar spent by the
government would go to the targeted groups.99 
Some proposals would diminish these tax-driven differences by
converting the deduction to a credit that would give all donors an
equal dollar value for each dollar donated.100 But that structure
would still allow wealthy donors to claim a government subsidy to
lobby. Because for-profit firms and the wealthy can spend much
more than poorer households, they would still claim a considerably
larger pile of government dollars.101
The crowding-out point would be less worrying to the extent that,
as some suggest, there are diminishing marginal returns from lob-
bying expenditures.102 If returns diminish quickly within the range
likely occupied by existing powerful organizations, then the subsidy
might usefully increase the representation of less powerful groups:
a dollar given to each group would produce greater returns for the
low-powered group than for the high-powered one. It also seems
plausible, though, that the returns curve is S-shaped, in that
lobbying by already-influential groups likely commands particular
attention from officials, until at some point the official is fully
captured and further expenditures have little effect. Figure 1 illus-
trates this possibility and others.
99. Cf. Overton, supra note 98, at 112-13 (noting that wealthy donors are likely to be
inframarginal). 
100. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH
31 fig.7 (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/
files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.
101. See John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
591, 644-45 (2005) (pointing to historical evidence that this was the case for the federal
campaign contribution tax credit); Gergen, supra note 62, at 1405-06 (arguing that even a
credit system will give wealthy donors control over how to allocate government dollars).
102. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 1, at 229.
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Figure 1: A Possible Relationship Between Expenditures and
Influence
In this graph, the impact of lobbying subsidies depends on where
existing powerful interests fall on the graph. Each arrow represents
a possible boost in expenditures represented by subsidies. By
assumption, underrepresented interests are at the arrow labeled A:
subsidies amplify their voice, but the return on expenditures is only
moderate. Whether this represents a net gain depends on whether
more powerful interests are mostly at the arrow labeled B or arrow
labeled C. If the most influential are at arrow C, the subsidy these
winners claim does not produce much greater influence, because
they have already bought all the influence that can be bought. In
that scenario, subsidies available to all, on net, increase the voice of
the poor. If the powerful are at point B, however, the voiceless are
net losers: the subsidy buys more influence per dollar for those who
already have some. Of course, wealthier interests can also spend
more dollars. 
Although many of these objections could be overcome if lobbying
were limited to only a select group of charities, that approach faces
significant challenges. Given that this theory does not clearly
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drawing rulings could be difficult, contentious, and politically
fraught.103 As with the question of eligibility for the deduction gen-
erally, a danger exists that government officials might selectively
favor the organizations with which they are ideologically aligned.104
I have suggested elsewhere some mechanisms for cabining this
problem, but they do not translate perfectly to the lobbying con-
text.105
It is also possible that the problem of crowd out and competition
from better-funded groups could be alleviated with tools short of
strict limits on lobbying by all charities. A sensible campaign fi-
nance regime, separate and apart from the tax system, might help
to ensure a level playing field for all. If it were really effective,
though, then the need for lobbying subsidies might itself wilt.
Sticking to regulations of charities per se, caps on the amount of
lobbying that could be carried out by any one organization—or
group of related organizations—would tend to limit the ability of
already-powerful groups to consume all the available political
oxygen. I have argued elsewhere that the current law’s restriction
of charities to an insubstantial amount of lobbying, if properly
understood, already constrains the amount of influence any one
entity can wield without losing its exemption.106 The interest rep-
resentation rationale, then, may be consistent with these existing
limits, if not a more dramatic constraint.
3. Political Pluralism
A final way in which government failure theorists explain
lobbying by nonprofits is to argue that lobbying on behalf of under-
represented groups benefits not only the groups but also society at
large. Incorporating competing views into major political discussions
103. See Mayer, supra note 47, at 549.
104. Cf. Chisholm, Matching, supra note 13, at 244 (noting several examples of when the
“IRS has ... taken advantage of definitional leeway in the tax provisions to suppress
unpopular ideology”).
105. See Galle, supra note 82, at 848-50. In brief, the translational problem is that it is not
obvious how to design a “costly screen” to exclude organizations that do not really “need” a
lobbying subsidy.
106. See Brian Galle, The LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of Charities,
103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 370, 376-78 (2009), available at http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/10/LRColl2009n10Galle.pdf.
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enriches the debate, they argue, challenging old verities and offering
innovative new alternatives.107 These arguments face many of the
same questions as interest representation theories: Would subsidies
actually amplify the voices of the underrepresented or instead crowd
them out? Would charities really offer an independent voice, or
would the prospect of an unlimited federal matching grant tempt
managers and outsiders to divert charity to other purposes?108
In addition, even if it proves the case that subsidies for lobbying
by charities significantly increase the influence of underrepresented
interests, a serious question remains as to whether such voices in
fact enrich politics rather than polarize it. Evidence suggests that
deliberation among individuals of differing views contributes to
better, more inclusive, and more legitimate-seeming government.109
When, however, politics consists not of conflict among individuals,
but among interest groups, these benefits of deliberation apparently
diminish.110 Membership in a homogenous group—such as most vol-
untary associations111—often appears to harden the views of the
group’s members, leaving them predisposed to doubt even basic fac-
tual propositions that would challenge their existing worldview.112
As more extreme sets of beliefs come into contact, they struggle to
agree on these basic facts, leading to gridlock and bitter partisan-
107. See sources cited supra note 69 and accompanying text.
108. For more consideration of this point, see infra Part III.A.5.
109. See CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 117-28
(1996); Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased Information Search in Group Decision Making, 78
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 655, 658 (2000).
110. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 105-08 (2000).
111. Pamela A. Popielarz & J. Miller McPherson, On the Edge or in Between: Niche
Position, Niche Overlap, and the Duration of Voluntary Association Memberships, 101 AM. J.
SOC. 698, 698-99, 704 (1995).
112. See Elisabeth S. Clemens, The Constitution of Citizens: Political Theories of Nonprofit
Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 207,
208, 211-12; Marc Hooghe, Voluntary Associations and Democratic Attitudes: Value
Congruence as a Causal Mechanism, in GENERATING SOCIAL CAPITAL: CIVIL SOCIETY AND
INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 89, 106 (Marc Hooghe & Dietlind Stolle eds.,
2003); Sunstein, supra note 110, at 85-96; cf. DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING THE OTHER SIDE:
DELIBERATIVE VERSUS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 3 (2006) (describing the author’s research
finding that heterogeneity of political views in groups reduces political engagement by their
members); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1468-71 (2011) (arguing that members of ideologically diverse groups
have stronger incentives to acquire new information). 
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ship rather than deliberation and compromise.113 Subsidies that
channel citizen participation into these kinds of outlier organiza-
tions might add some voices to public debate at the cost of making
our public debate more toxic overall.114
Another way that lobbying subsidies can contribute to polarized
debate is by channeling political conversations into narrowly
focused organizations. Most entities do not represent their stake-
holders’ global interests but instead focus on one or two goals or
issues.115 As Samuel Issacharoff and Daniel Ortiz argue, these
entities are often bound contractually to their vision and must
“argue[ ] without compromise” rather than represent the more
nuanced views of their principals.116 
To sum up, the government failure rationale does not necessarily
offer support for nonprofit lobbying. Although there is still a case to
be made, a number of unresolved empirical questions about the way
lobbying works might undermine that case severely. 
B. Privatization Rationale
Although most of the debate over lobbying restrictions has so far
centered on the traditional rationales for charity, there are also
other grounds for the deduction. One of these is the claim that the
deduction helps to transfer the production of public goods from the
113. See, e.g., BILL BISHOP WITH ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING
OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 171, 176-81 (2008) (describing how the self-
selection of Americans into churches with like-minded people correlated with increased
polarization between the denominations along partisan lines); TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE
TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 16-21
(1995).
114. See Morris P. Fiorina, Extreme Voices: A Dark Side of Civic Engagement, in CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 395, 396 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds.,
1999); see also MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK 1 (1986) (arguing that in-group
bonds may lead to intergroup conflict); Margaret Levi, Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review
Essay of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, 24 POL. & SOC’Y 45, 47-48 (1996) (book
review) (same); cf. Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad: Recognizing
the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the Charitable
Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 1024 (2010) (arguing that allowing deductions for
“organizations that ... promote particular viewpoint[s] on ... which there is reasonable
disagreement” contributes to social conflict over the meaning of “the good” life). 
115. See Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 77, at 1655-56.
116. Id. at 1656; see also Hasen, supra note 18, at 35-36 (noting incentives of subsidy
recipients to concentrate contributions in single-issue groups).
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government to the private sector.117 Some argue that this relocation
is helpful because the private sector outperforms government,118
whereas others simply hail the opportunity to reduce the coercive
power of the state.119 My own view is that both of these claims are
mistaken, for reasons I explain elsewhere.120 
For my purposes here, I only want to point out that, if one accepts
the privatization rationale, strong limits on lobbying would seem to
follow. Since the point of the deduction, in this view, is to substitute
private production for government production, lobbying the govern-
ment to “get stuff” is antithetical to the deduction’s purpose.121
Defensive lobbying or lobbying to repeal programs and cut taxes of
course would be more palatable, although it is unclear why this
should be a function of the nonprofit sector.122 
Further, the rules for enforcing any such regime would be difficult
to implement. Defeating one piece of legislation may leave another
preexisting one in place. Deciding which set of laws better repre-
sents privatization’s values would be a controversial task for which
government bureaucrats seem especially poorly suited.
117. See Helmut K. Anheier & Lester M. Salamon, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative
Perspective, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 89, 92.
Lloyd Mayer’s recent arguments for nonprofit “autonomy” may also fall in this category. Lloyd
Hitoshi Mayer, The “Independent” Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of Autonomy,
65 VAND. L. REV. 51, 75-76 (2012).
118. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 406-07 (1998); David
M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private
Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 262 (2009).
119. See, e.g., Kenneth Prewitt, Foundations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 355, 358-59.
120. Galle, supra note 82, at 782.
121. Some privatization advocates base their preference for nonprofits in part on the
superior information of nonprofit donors. See Levmore, supra note 118, at 409-10; Schizer,
supra note 118, at 260-62. These theorists might embrace lobbying for government services,
so long as the end products of government were guided by the better-informed choices of
donors and managers. Considering the many limits on government discretion, and the many
other voices that likely guide any policy choice, though, it is unlikely that government
production would embody the preferences of donors and managers as clearly as a nonprofit
under the control of donors would. Cf. Galston, supra note 13, at 1323-24 (noting that lobbying
organizations may no longer be able to capitalize on their differences from government). So
Levmore and Schizer should probably oppose nonprofit lobbying. See Galle, supra note 82, at
783-84 n.15.
122. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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C. Government Complement Rationale
Finally, I have argued at length in prior work that none of these
other rationales are fully satisfying, and that instead the best
justification for subsidizing nonprofits is that nonprofits are a useful
complement to a multitiered system of government.123 Although in
theory governments in a federal system are forced to compete with
one another for, in Alexander Hamilton’s term, the “affection” of
their citizens,124 in reality interjurisdictional competition is often
congested by citizens’ inability to move to the jurisdiction they think
is performing the best.125 Nonprofits can fill in this gap, offering a
rival source of services citizens can use as an alternative to, or as a
yardstick for measuring the quality of, other governments.126 The
credible threat of these alternatives may itself improve the quality
of government.127 Additionally, sometimes intergovernmental com-
petition is too severe, as when states “race to the bottom” to curtail
redistributive spending.128 Here, too, nonprofits perhaps can supply
services when federalism fails. 
For the federalism complement rationale to function, govern-
ments and nonprofits must likely compete with each other on some-
thing like an even footing.129 This implies that nonprofits should be
relatively free from government controls and vice versa. A govern-
ment that can hamstring its rival would not feel pressure to
perform. At the same time, a nonprofit that can strongly influence
the behavior of its government rival would not provide true com-
parative information to the public, perhaps resulting in public
decisions to privatize even when government could have outper-
formed the charity.130 
123. Galle, supra note 82, at 790-835.
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
125. Galle, supra note 82, at 815.
126. Id. at 817-18.
127. Cf. Thomas S. Dee, Competition and the Quality of Public Schools, 17 ECON. EDUC.
REV. 419 (1998) (reviewing evidence finding that the threat of private schools improves some
measures of public school output).
128. Galle, supra note 82, at 826-27, 840.
129. Id. at 851.
130. Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 90-91 (2010) (noting that firm managers may lobby to enact
rules that favor themselves).
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The even-footing principle therefore probably implies at least
some partial restrictions on lobbying. Although nonprofits should be
limited in their ability to lobby the government with which they
compete, they would still be free to lobby others. Lobbying on topics
that could not plausibly affect the nonprofit’s relationship with rival
public providers should also be permissible, although that line could
be challenging to draw in close cases. 
The even-footing story may be less cogent for nonprofits that do
not compete with government. The competition story makes sense
for educational institutions: when a private school opens, political
support for high-quality local schools falls.131 On the other hand,
churches and other institutions of worship obviously have no public
competitors for their central mission.132 There is no rival govern-
ment service that should be shielded from church influence.
Similarly, organizations whose membership and operations are
scattered widely across many jurisdictions might compete with the
public sector but could not easily focus their lobbying on one rival
government, limiting the need to protect government from their
efforts.133
At the same time, the government complement approach to char-
ity also offers some reasons to welcome lobbying. Lobbying could be
a way to “get stuff” that excessive interjurisdictional competition
would discourage governments from otherwise providing.134 It is also
a potential tool for reforming low-quality governments.135 
On balance, the potential gains from lobbying under this ratio-
nale, and the complexity of drawing distinctions between helpful
and less helpful political participation, probably make a strong
prohibition unwise. But perhaps a brightly delineated limit on lob-
bying against the provision of services similar to those offered by the
charity could be administered easily enough, and is important
enough to this rationale for the deduction, that it would be worth
the challenges.
131. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 295-97 (3d ed. 2011). For a
discussion of evidence of crowding out in other public goods, see id. at 198-99. 
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
133. See Galle, supra note 82, at 822.
134. See id. at 826-27.
135. See id. at 814.
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D. An Initial Assessment Proves Incomplete 
So far I have focused on the internal logic of the charitable
contribution deduction. I have asked whether, given the underlying
rationales for the deduction, the government might be justified in
limiting lobbying in order to preserve taxpayer dollars for their
intended purposes. In resolving that question, the unsettled basis
for the deduction has turned out to be a problem. One possible
reason the deduction is so popular is because it can appeal to both
ends of the ideological spectrum, offering the possibility of redistri-
bution and social empowerment to liberals while giving the promise
of privatization and smaller government to conservatives.136 This
incompletely theorized consensus breaks down, however, when it
comes to writing lobbying rules, as the two currently accepted
theories seem to give diametrically opposite results. Diversity
rationales would likely disallow lobbying in opposition to govern-
ment, whereas privatization theorists would allow only lobbying in
opposition. 
Another obstacle for lobbying under any of the theories is that
none of them, standing alone, explains why lobbying must be done
by charitable organizations. For instance, diversity proponents
claim that minority interests will be disappointed by the political
process.137 To the extent this claim is true, that failure can be over-
come simply by bolstering the political power of minority groups.
That bolstering could be in the form of subsidies to nonprofits that
represent these groups, but it could also come in the form of
subsidies for individual lobbying efforts, or money directed to a
separate organization that only lobbies.138 The next Part considers
the pros and cons of these various approaches.
136. See Knauer, supra note 87, at 1063-66.
137. See supra text accompanying note 88.
138. Indeed, the “get stuff” rationale arguably favors lobbying subsidies over nonprofit
subsidies. There is some evidence that lobbying at the federal level by for-profit firms can
yield returns of more than 100:1. Hasen, supra note 1, at 233. Even if one assumes, as one
surely should, that the lobbying expenditures these firms are willing to publically admit to
are considerably lower than their actual expenses, these numbers still represent impressive
returns on investment.
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      III. LOBBYING CHARITIES OR A SUBSIDY FOR LOBBYING?:    
ECONOMIES AND DISECONOMIES OF SCOPE
So far I have argued that the internal logic of most rationales for
the charitable contribution deduction appears open to at least some
degree of lobbying, although that consensus erodes when we at-
tempt to identify which forms of lobbying should be permissible.
Assuming that this dissensus could be overcome, we still face the
question whether lobbying subsidies must necessarily be combined
with subsidies for charitable activities. None of the arguments I
have surveyed so far clearly explain why the two activities should
or should not be carried out at the same time by the same entities. 
There is, however, an extensive economic literature devoted to the
optimal design of organizations.139 In this literature, managers of
firms and governments must decide which activities to combine
together and which to spin off under separate management.140 A key
factor in these decisions is whether some activities complement each
other when conducted together, such as when control over one
facilitates production of the other.141 These kinds of combinations
are known as “economies of scope.”142 The opposite is also possible:
some combinations are worse off for one or both halves. A classic
example is the branding problems faced by a conglomerate that tries
to produce both pesticides and baby food: “Raid Products: Deadly for
Bugs, Great for Your Kids!”143 These are diseconomies of scope. My
argument here is that in many cases, combining charitable endeav-
ors with lobbying produces diseconomies of scope that exceed any
likely economies, and that avoiding these unwanted combinations
139. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Ulrike Malmendier, Behavioral Economics of
Organizations, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 235, 235-72 (Peter A.
Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007).
140. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, in THE
NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 90 (Oliver E. Williamson &
Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993).
141. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 710-18 (1986) (using the insurance
industry to illustrate that vertical integration may be optimal in these types of situations).
142. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 268, 268
(1981).
143. True story! See Rev. Rul. 2003-110, 2003-2 C.B. 1083 (using this combination as an
example of a firm that has good business reasons for a tax-free split up).
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could justify government restrictions on nonprofit lobbying, what-
ever our rationale for the deduction. 
A. Diseconomies
Combining lobbying with other charitable activity can reduce
social welfare in five distinct ways. One of these is already famil-
iar from debates over the separation of church and state.
Commentators since before James Madison have argued that
politics can potentially distract private sector enterprises from their
original purposes.144 I review that debate briefly here and add some
new evidence from the management literature. I also raise four
other ways in which combining the two functions may reduce the
cost effectiveness of either. Combined organizations can increase the
inframarginality of the government’s subsidies, raise donor and
government agency monitoring costs, and reduce the “warm glow”
that empowers the charitable sector. In addition, I argue that the
economically ideal tools for reaching the socially optimal levels of
charity and lobbying are incompatible with one another. 
1. Agency Costs
First, conducting charity and lobbying under one roof exacerbates
the social costs of controlling nonprofit employees. Of course, when
one set of people performs tasks for another, there is always some
degree of slack, or divergence between the preferences of the prin-
cipal and the performance of the agent.145 Principals must invest
time and resources in monitoring their agents to reduce these slip-
pages.146 It is a familiar point that this problem is especially acute
in the nonprofit sector.147 Nonprofit outputs are hard to evaluate,
144. See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 82 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 1987); Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1831, 1849-53 (2009) (describing, for example, John Milton’s corruption
argument against establishment).
145. George P. Baker, Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement, 100 J. POL.
ECON. 598, 599-600, 606 (1992).
146. ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS
LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 8, 17-18 (1998).
147. SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 90, at 131-33; Ribstein, supra note 86, at 1045. But
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and stakeholders tend to free ride on one anothers’ efforts at
monitoring the officers of the firm, lack many legal tools for
compelling accountability, and have no ownership shares they can
distribute to managers to align managers’ incentives with their
own.148 Churches do not even have to file tax returns, making their
finances particularly opaque.149
This is not to say that nonprofit managers are wholly unrespon-
sive to outside incentives. Managers legally can be, and often are,
rewarded for good performance with bonuses, additional donations,
greater authority, or other perks.150 Studies find that managers do
respond both to explicit incentives, such as cost-cutting targets at
hospitals, and also to implicit incentives, such as their perception of
potential donors’ preferences.151
One well-known problem with these kinds of goal-oriented
incentives is that they can be imprecise; if not carefully designed,
they can severely distort desired managerial behavior. For example,
when managers have multiple tasks, but their incentives measure
one task more precisely, managers will tend to devote much more
effort to hitting the better-measured target.152 The manager’s lack
see CRIMM & WINER, supra note 69, at 122 (asserting, without explanation, that churches “can
protect themselves from being inappropriately co-opted”). 
148. Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law and Public
Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731, 754-55 (1994) (reviewing WHO
BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992)); James R. Hines Jr.
et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1198
(2010); Manne, supra note 79, at 234-36. Social cohesion, groupthink, and outright trading of
favors also make nonprofit insiders poor monitors of one another. Melanie B. Leslie, The
Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1198-201,
1205-09 (2010).
149. I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(A) (2006); see Tobin, supra note 13, at 1341-42 (noting the possibility
that this opacity offers for diverting funds into campaign activity).
150. See Hines et al., supra note 148, at 1194-95; Myron J. Roomkin & Burton A. Weisbrod,
Managerial Compensation and Incentives in For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals, 15 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 750, 765, 772 (1999) (distinguishing and comparing bonus incentive schemes in for-
profit and nonprofit hospitals).
151. James A. Brickley & R. Lawrence Van Horn, Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit
Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals, 45 J.L. & ECON. 227, 246 (2002) (concluding that
explicit managerial incentives in nonprofit hospitals in some ways mirror explicit incentives
in for-profit hospitals); see Ranjani Krishnan et al., Financial Disclosure Management by
Nonprofit Organizations 1-2 (July 19, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319581 (finding that nonprofit managers
manipulate reporting of expenses to attract donors).
152. See Daron Acemoglu et al., Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments, 24 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 273, 274 (2008); Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 20, at 23-33. For evidence,
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of effort on the alternate task is easy to overlook or cover up,
allowing her to focus on the task that she prefers or that will earn
her rewards.153
Overcoming the distorting effects of mismatched incentives can
be costly. The principal can attempt to mitigate the multiple-task
problem by writing more detailed incentives. The principal and
agent must then bear the costs of drafting the more-detailed
incentives, negotiating them, and measuring success or failure in
meeting them.154 Wealthier interest groups may be better able to
invest in monitoring, further exacerbating the disparities of a
lobbying subsidy.155
Monitoring in multitask firms becomes more complex if the tasks
would pull managers in different directions.156 For instance, CEOs
of large firms serve at least two sets of investors: shareholders and
creditors. Shareholders want the CEO to take risks; bondholders
typically want the opposite.157 Providing the CEO with a set of
incentives that simultaneously satisfy both is difficult; firms often
resort to complex legal agreements with their creditors, granting the
see Michael Cragg, Performance Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from the Job
Training Partnership Act, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 147, 161-62 (1997) (finding in the study that
more intensive incentives in the Job Training Partnership Act lead to “creamskimming”), and
Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and
Predictors of Teacher Cheating, 118 Q.J. ECON. 843, 844 (2003) (noting research that has
shown “instances of manipulation, including documented shifts away from nontested areas
or ‘teaching to the test’”). 
153. See AVINASH K. DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION-COST
POLITICS PERSPECTIVE 96 (1996); Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory
and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1136-41 (1997).
154. Mathias Dewatripont et al., Multitask Agency Problems: Focus and Task Clustering,
44 EUR. ECON. REV. 869, 876 (2000) (discussing the costs of optimal task clustering).
155. Cf. Chisholm, Matching, supra note 13, at 281 (noting that “powerless” groups also
cannot control their agents).
156. Avinash Dixit, Power of Incentives in Private Versus Public Organizations, 87 AM.
ECON. REV. 378, 378-79 (1997); cf. George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital
Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable
Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1148 (2004) (noting agency problems in nonprofit firms
in which different donors have different priorities).
157. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334-35 (1976); Charles
K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF CORPORATE LAW 68, 71-72 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
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creditor extensive power to investigate and even control the firm’s
behavior.158
My claim, then, is that combining lobbying and charitable
functions within one nonprofit firm creates these kinds of tensions
and costs. Asking managers to pursue both lobbying and charity
seems to present both problems associated with incentivizing
multiple goals: each goal is hard to incentivize accurately and the
two are sometimes in tension. Monitoring agents who lobby is even
more difficult than monitoring the direct production of charitable
services.159 Managers might prefer to overemphasize lobbying,
because that would allow them greater rents and lower accountabil-
ity.160 Further, lobbying may conflict with other nonprofit goals,
such as maintaining independence from government.161 And de-
fining “success” for the production of public goods is, as I have noted,
difficult. 
Nonprofits lack the tools other firms can employ to overcome the
multiple-task problem. A for-profit firm might force managers to
internalize the costs of their divided loyalty by giving managers an
ownership stake in the firm.162 Nonprofits cannot employ that
option, however, so it may instead be optimal simply to prohibit
managers from lobbying or to split the tasks between two entities.163
It is worth noting that conflicts between incentives to lobby and
incentives to carry out other functions can arise even if charity
supporters do not encourage managers to lobby. Lobbying offers
managers opportunities for private gains, such as vindication of
158. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1226-28 (2006); Robert E. Scott, A Relational
Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 926-27 (1986). 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83; see also Murphy, supra note 66, at 81
(noting that donors cannot prevent an organization’s use of funds for unintended political
purposes).
160. Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 130, at 90-92 (arguing that for-profit managers
may lobby to enact state rules favoring their interests over those of shareholders).
161. Tobin, supra note 13, at 1337.
162. See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 20, at 40-41.
163. See Bengt Holmstrom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 74, 90-99
(1999) (offering an argument similar to Holmstrom’s earlier articles but with more math);
Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 20, at 42-48 (arguing that prohibiting managers from
engaging in some activities or dividing tasks between teams may be the second-best result if
outputs cannot be measured and incentive pay is weak).
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personal ideological preferences or political ties that may facilitate
outside career advancement.164
Allowing lobbying also increases monitoring costs for the gov-
ernment. For one, donors primarily rely upon state organizational
law and federal tax law to protect their interests in the nonprofit
firm. Therefore court time and other government-funded litigation
expenses will rise as principals’ need for monitoring increases. 
Further, the government will likely monitor to protect its own
interests in seeing its subsidies properly spent. The government,
too, wants managers to work hard and not simply collect their sal-
aries and pretend to serve charitable interests. More importantly,
no theory of the deduction would grant unlimited license to organ-
izations to lobby on any subject.165 Any lobbying by nonprofits would
therefore still be subject to oversight to ensure that the organization
engages only in permissible lobbying. That task is greatly compli-
cated in an organization that carries out multiple tasks, because it
is relatively easy to transfer value from one activity to another off
the books.166 An e-mail list that is supposedly compiled to send
around the church newsletter can also be used to encourage mem-
bers to call their member of Congress or to vote against a ballot
initiative.167
It might be argued in response to my claims so far that, although
greater agent autonomy does frustrate the goals of principals, it
does not necessarily reduce social welfare. Agents, after all, are
people too, and if they get what they want we should count that as
a gain for society. This response is unpersuasive for two reasons.
For one, principals will typically respond to increased slack by
spending more on monitoring, which is mostly deadweight loss:
hours spent filling out time sheets and verifying them are hours
164. Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 77, at 1653-54; Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box:
Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 615-
19 (1997).
165. See supra Part II.D.
166. See Leff, supra note 13, at 708-10 (using the allocation of a minister’s paid time as an
example); see also Kahn, supra note 164, at 656 (suggesting that the IRS cannot detect these
kinds of transfers).
167. See Galle, supra note 106, at 374-75; see also Mosley, supra note 94, at 62 (“E-mail,
in particular, facilitates advocacy activity [by nonprofits].”). For a detailed analysis of other
transfers between 501(c)(3)s, (c)(4)s, and PACs, see Kerlin & Reid, supra note 47, at 810-18.
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both sides could have spent doing more productive tasks.168 For
another, many of the gains for agents are private gains, whereas the
losses to principals are public goods. In other words, it is not just
donors to charity who are losing but also all beneficiaries as well.
Donors will likely not invest the socially optimal amount of effort
into increased monitoring, because by definition they do not fully
internalize the benefits of the public good for society.169 Admittedly,
sometimes nonprofit officers will use their slack to accomplish their
own vision of the public good, but they may also use it to enjoy
leisure time, to pursue esoteric personal goals, or to leverage their
own social or political standing.170
2. Effects on Warm Glow
Another possible, but empirically open, question about political
activity by nonprofits is whether it may suppress the personal
satisfaction, or “warm glow,” of donors and other charitable sup-
porters. Warm glow is an important potential explanation for the
success of the nonprofit sector.171 American voluntary contributions
to the purchase of public goods far exceed the amounts that could be
explained easily by classic economics or the effect of the de-
duction.172 Perhaps donors are “pure” altruists who internalize the
well being of others and who would give even if they experienced no
rewards for themselves from their gift. A more psychologically
realistic alternative is that many of us are “impure” altruists, and
we give because being seen as generous carries public esteem and
gratitude, sends a signal of wealth and power, makes us feel we are
good people, or relieves a sense of moral or social obligation.173 It is
168. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011).
169. On the general theory of externalities, see GRUBER, supra note 131, at 122-29.
170. Cf. Theda Skocpol, Advocates Without Members: The Recent Transformation of
American Civic Life, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 114, at 461,
492-504 (developing an extended argument that free riding by members of interest groups
allows their agents to pool resources for the agents’ own, often extreme, political views).
171. James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-
Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464-65 (1990).
172. See id.; Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 568, 572.
173. Andreoni, supra note 171, at 464.
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this second set of motives that—following a large social science
literature—I describe as warm glow.174
Extensive evidence now points to warm glow as a larger compo-
nent of the public’s reasons for giving than pure altruism.175
Laboratory and real-world studies both confirm the intuition of
fundraising professionals that public acknowledgment of donors
increases giving.176 Another important piece of evidence is donors’
response to the news that some other entity has already spent
money pursuing the donors’ goals.177 If donors are pure altruists,
this news should reduce their own spending, because they should
care only about the beneficiaries’ welfare. Instead, donors do not
reduce much, and in some cases even increase their giving, suggest-
ing that it is important to donors that they be the ones to support
the cause.178 Warm glow motivation by charitable employees seems
to lower the salary they demand, and this fact in turn may motivate
donors to choose the charitable form as an especially cost-effective
tool.179
Returning to politics, we might hypothesize two competing warm
glow effects of greatly expanded lobbying activity by charities. One
possibility is that introducing politics will result in a kind of brand
dilution for the nonprofit sector. I have argued previously that
allowing for-profit firms to conduct charitable works would diminish
the luster of charity by confusing donors and other observers.180
174. E.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 701, 712 (1996).
175. For reviews, see Vesterlund, supra note 172, at 572-81 (discussing warm glow in the
context of other private benefits), and B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral
Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with Non-Standard Decision Makers 57-60
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11,518, 2005), available at http://www.
nber.org/ papers/w11518.
176. Vesterlund, supra note 172, at 578.
177. David C. Ribar & Mark O. Wilhelm, Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving Motivations in
Charitable Behavior, 110 J. POL. ECON. 425, 427 (2002); Vesterlund, supra note 172, at 573-
74.
178. See Ribar & Wilhelm, supra note 177, at 428; Vesterlund, supra note 172, at 573.
179. Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (2010); see GERALD
MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL
THEORY 61-63 (1993) (hypothesizing that donors are attracted to firms in which they can
leverage the value of other contributions).
180. Galle, supra note 179, at 1222-25; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and
Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 99 (1978) (suggesting that pay for good acts obscures the social
1598 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1561
Society would no longer be able to easily recognize which organiza-
tions were nobly sacrificing gain for the greater good and which
were trying to make a buck. Employees who gave up cash rewards
in exchange for public recognition of their virtue would find the
noncash portions drying up, leading to convergence between
nonprofit and for-profit salaries.181 That, in turn, might lead donors
who sought to leverage below-market nonprofit salaries to turn
elsewhere.
One could tell a similar, and perhaps even broader, story about
political activity. The public may realize that narrow private inter-
ests can more easily summon lobbying support182 and interpret
charitable lobbying accordingly. There would be no ready way for
the public to verify that a charity’s lobbying is more public spirited,
and few observers would have incentives to investigate on their
own.183 Further, because lobbying in pursuit of a shared goal would
be susceptible to free riding across groups, lobbying by any one of
those groups alone could be a signal that the firm is instead pur-
suing some private purpose.184 
Organizations could not necessarily preserve their reputation by
avoiding lobbying. Although actual donors might take the trouble to
read the firm’s tax return to verify its reported lobbying expendi-
tures, casual observers will provide the bulk of the general goodwill
prized by warm-glow-motivated employees, and the general public
will be rather unlikely to be able to distinguish between firms that
lobby and those that do not.185 Even if only some firms lobby, all
rewards of altruism).
181. See Galle, supra note 179, at 1224-25.
182. See OLSON, supra note 71, at 132-33. For a review of the evidence on either side of
Olson’s hypothesis, see Gary M. Anderson et al., The Economic Theory of Clubs, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 175-80 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds.,
2003).
183. See Jill Nicholson-Crotty, Does Reported Policy Activity Reduce Contributions to
Nonprofit Service Providers?, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 591, 596 (2011) (explaining the cost of
understanding organizational expenditures).
184. See Hsu, supra note 73, at 123-24 (suggesting that lobbying can be a signal of private
benefit); cf. JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS,
PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 43, 46 (1991) (describing theories in which production
of what looks like public goods may depend on efforts of individuals who have a taste for
personal political power); id. at 53-54 (arguing that most interest groups are supported by
large institutional players or wealthy individuals).
185. Cf. Stephanie Moulton & Adam Eckerd, Preserving the Publicness of the Nonprofit
Sector: Resources, Roles, and Public Values, 41 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 656, 671
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might suffer a reputational hit. Additionally, the branding effects of
lobbying could reduce the warm glow of all potential donors, not just
employees.186 Partisan politics, as others have suggested, may carry
a taint or air of conflict that the nonprofit sector has until now
largely avoided, diminishing the perceived returns of being known
as a charitable benefactor.187
On the other hand, there certainly are existing charities with a
sharply defined ideological position, and the fact that these organ-
izations sometimes thrive suggests a possible offsetting gain of
increased politicization.188 Sociologists suggest that at least a por-
tion of warm glow is likely related to donors’ feelings that they have
personally participated in achieving their self-defined public policy
goals.189 That sense of ideological accomplishment can also help to
explain voting and nondeductible contributions to political cam-
paigns, both of which should be rare under a classic economic
framework.190
& tbl.5 (2012) (reporting results of a survey of 100 organizations, in which those more
dependent on individual donations were less inclined to political advocacy). 
186. See id.
187. See Houck, supra note 13, at 85; Hsu, supra note 73, at 106, 116-20 & tbl.7 (offering
evidence of this effect).
188. See Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 183, at 596 (arguing that lobbying activity may be
attractive to some donors). Nicholson-Crotty reports that increased lobbying activity is
correlated with higher donations in her sample. Id. at 592. There are a number of econometric
questions about that finding. Most significantly, Nicholson-Crotty does not appear to have
accounted adequately for potential endogeneity problems—that is, rather than lobbying
causing donations, it may be that a common unobserved factor causes both. In particular, if
demand for public goods is increasing, we should expect demand for both charity and
government services to rise, which in turn would likely be reflected both in more donations
and more lobbying. Her findings could also simply be evidence that charities sold the value
of their donation. For example, her observation that firms that lobbied more in 2000 received
more donations in 2001, id. at 597-600 & tbl.2, could imply that organizations lobbied in
exchange for a pledge to contribute money in future years. Finally, the years 2000 and 2001
were an unusual period for charitable giving because of the vast amount of stock market
wealth in the hands of donors. Tax law greatly favors donations by owners of appreciated
stock. Joseph J. Cordes, Re-Thinking the Deduction for Charitable Contributions: Evaluating
the Effects of Deficit-Reduction Proposals, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 1001, 1002 (2011). Therefore,
Nicholson-Crotty’s results could be driven in part by the fact that stock owners happened to
prefer organizations with greater inclination to lobby. Cf. id. (providing a statistical summary
of differing donation preferences of wealthy and middle-class donors). 
189. David Knoke, Incentives in Collective Action Organizations, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 311, 326
(1988).
190. See HARDIN, supra note 83, at 108-12.
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It is possible that both models could exist simultaneously in
different pools of organizations.191 Some classes of entities will try
to present a staid, apolitical image: think of museums and perform-
ing arts centers. Others, such as environmental groups or antiabor-
tion organizations, might embrace the more politically engaged
image. An important question would be to what extent the activities
and image of one group spill over onto the other, or if some groups
that cannot clearly shape their own image for the public will be
pooled together, getting the benefits of neither extreme. As I said,
these all seem like plausible theoretical possibilities; further field
work is needed to sort out which effects are the most important.192
3. Regulatory Mismatch
Another potential negative consequence of combining lobbying
and charity in one entity is that different regulatory tools are
optimal for each, and in many instances, cannot be simultaneously
employed. In particular, political markets should arguably be reg-
ulated with sticks whereas charity should be regulated with carrots.
As I have explained in prior work, subsidies to encourage good
behavior can potentially be replaced with a punishment for those
who fail to do good.193 Both options have similar effects on the
marginal incentives of donors.194 Whether donors are rewarded, or
nondonors fined, giving an additional dollar saves donors money
relative to not giving.195 However, the two mechanisms vary in a
number of other important ways. Which option is the better choice
for a particular policy depends largely on these other factors.196
Except in unusual circumstances, sticks are the more efficient
tool for reining in the social overproduction of some negative
externality-laden good.197 Sticks earn the government money,
191. See Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 183, at 596-97.
192. Some studies report that political activity does not diminish contributions to the
lobbying nonprofit. See id. at 592. But the studies do not consider whether there are
reputational externalities—whether lobbying by some firms affects giving to others. 
193. Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price
Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 848-50 (2012).
194. POSNER, supra note 168, at 10.
195. Id.
196. Galle, supra note 193, at 814-24.
197. For development of the points in this paragraph, see id.
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whereas carrots drain the treasury, wasting hard-won tax revenues.
Carrots give producers more resources to create the unwanted good
and may even increase their demand for it, a phenomenon known as
the “income effect.”198 Carrots are wasteful if producers plan to cut
back on their activities anyway. And overproducers who know they
will be paid a carrot to curtail their activities in the future have an
incentive to begin overproducing, whereas the opposite is true of
sticks.
In contrast, carrots are more defensible for encouraging the pro-
duction of a good with positive externalities, for which we would
expect social underproduction.199 In that case, the fact that carrot
recipients have more resources is desirable, because we want them
to produce or demand more of the good. On the other hand, it is still
the case that the expectation of future carrots has unwanted
incentive effects, encouraging producers to delay producing the good
until the government agrees to pay them. Carrots also remain cost-
lier, especially when factoring in the possibility that some might
produce the good altruistically without subsidy.200 Thus, even
though carrots are less clearly dominated by sticks in the positive
externality setting, a question remains whether they are worth the
cost.
On this account the subsidy for contributions to charity is at least
plausibly efficient. The central question would be whether the
increased donations we see as a result of donors’ greater wealth
from receiving carrots is worth the cost of the subsidy. As part of
this cost, we would also have to consider the extent to which many
donors would be willing to give even without government reward;
again, data suggest that personal motives for giving are widespread
and quite substantial.201 
At the same time, these factors suggest that failures in the
political market should probably be corrected with sticks.202 As we
saw earlier, spending money on lobbying is like driving a care: it is
198. GRUBER, supra note 131, at 36.
199. See Galle, supra note 193, at 831-32.
200. See id. at 819-20.
201. Vesterlund, supra note 172, at 569-78.
202. Cf. David S. Gamage, Note, Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes
in Campaign Finance, 113 YALE L.J. 1283, 1288-321 (2004) (arguing that a corrective tax is
superior to campaign spending limits under some assumptions).
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a great way to get somewhere if no one else is on the road, but at
rush hour, you might be better off walking.203 More technically,
lobbying is likely subject to congestion, in which use of a shared
resource creates negative externalities for other users.204 Of course,
lobbying also provides positive externalities to those with similar
goals as the lobbyers.205 It therefore represents a hybrid good, falling
somewhere between pure positive externality and pure negative
externality goods. As such, the argument for political carrots is
tenuous. Carrots would enrich donors to lobbying organizations,
leading to more lobbying. More lobbying contributes both to
congestion and political expression for the organizations’ other
supporters. Theory thus does not clearly predict whether the net
income effect from enriching donors would increase social welfare.
Given that the income effect is the primary argument in favor of
carrots, this point significantly weakens the case for lobbying
carrots. 
This mismatch between the regulation of charity and lobbying is
a reason to separate the two functions. Granting carrots to some of
an organization’s donors and imposing sticks on others would be
prohibitively difficult. Donors would have to earmark the purpose
of their money, but because money is fungible, this earmarking
would not actually be meaningful in most cases. Even if it were,
enforcement would be challenging, because money can buy
resources—such as staff time and office space—that can be shared
between purposes easily and invisibly.206 Segregating lobbying and
charity therefore better enables society to choose the more efficient
regulatory tool for each activity.
Finally on the mismatch issue, even if lobbying and charity would
both be best regulated with the same tool, they may have different
marginal values. That is, it is very unlikely that both would happen
to be underproduced by the same amount. For reasons I just noted,
it would be difficult to subsidize one more than the other. As a
result, if they are bound together, subsidizing one to an optimal
degree means over- or undersubsidizing the other. 
203. Cf. Hsu, supra note 73, at 95-96 (analogizing traffic to campaign spending).
204. Id.
205. See Galle, supra note 193, at 831-32.
206. See Leff, supra note 13, at 707-08.
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4. Inframarginality of the Deduction
Next, allowing charities to lobby may reduce the cost effectiveness
of subsidies for charitable activities by increasing the portion of
inframarginal recipients of the subsidy. The efficacy of any subsidy
is limited by the possibility that some of those who will receive it
might have undertaken the desired activity anyway.207 These recip-
ients are inframarginal: they are not among the group of beneficia-
ries whose choice is tipped over the edge from inaction to action by
a bonus payment. Dollars given to inframarginal recipients are
wasted, from the government’s perspective, because—aside from
possible income effects—each dollar spent in that way increases the
subsidized activity by $0.208 
If subsidized nonprofits can lobby, then they can also drive up the
inframarginality of their donors. To explain this point, I first have
to offer some background on why so many donors to charity are
marginal. Inframarginality depends to a significant degree on a
donor’s menu of options. As I have argued, some nonprofits compete
directly with governments.209 When acting alone, however, individ-
ual donors would typically have little influence over government
policy. Thus, as other studies have found, public spending crowds
out private alternatives.210 Would-be donors to private institutions
know they cannot also reduce the taxes they will pay for the
competing public institution, so they are willing to accept a less-
than-ideal government substitute rather than pay the entire cost of
207. Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 675, 680-81 (1992).
208. Even if income effects are significant, dollars given to inframarginal donors will still
very likely be less cost effective than money for marginal donors, because the latter will
experience both income and substitution effects. Only in the improbable event that income
effects are systematically larger for inframarginal donors than for marginal donors would the
inframarginal subsidy be more efficacious. A more plausible scenario in which the usefulness
of the two dollars would be comparable is if the substitution effect for the subsidized good is
very small, such as when demand is highly inelastic. 
209. See WALKER, supra note 184, at 46 (explaining that donors join groups for increased
material benefit).
210. Bruce R. Kingma & Robert McClelland, Public Radio Stations Are Really, Really Not
Public Goods: Charitable Contributions and Impure Altruism, 66 ANNALS PUB. &
COOPERATIVE ECON. 65 (1995) (summarizing other findings and reporting authors’ own study);
A. Abigail Payne, Does the Government Crowd-Out Private Donations? New Evidence from a
Sample of Non-Profit Firms, 69 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1998).
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a charitable rival that might be only a bit better.211 As a result, in
the presence of government competition, many potential donors are
marginal: they would not give unless they received a subsidy.212
Subsidies for lobbying change this calculus, allowing charities to
reduce government competition and therefore increase the infra-
marginality of their donors.213 Though individual donors are likely
to free ride on one another’s efforts to offset competing government
services, the lobbying subsidy would be designed to overcome
exactly this obstacle.214 Once government services are reduced,
many donors would be willing to contribute without any subsidy.215
Allowing the charity to help direct the efforts of their lobbying
compatriots against government competitors would also waste some
of the resources that the lobbying wing of the organization could
have devoted to its own priorities.216
5. Entanglement and Executive Attention
Finally, the long-standing claim that politics distracts nonprofit
managers and distorts their goals can be understood as a diseco-
nomy of scope argument. Madison believed that the irresistible
211. See, e.g., GRUBER, supra note 131, at 295-97.
212. See Galle, supra note 82, at 821.
213. Admittedly, not all charities compete with the government. I have argued that
competition should be the key feature for eligibility, see id. at 813-35, but my view is not
current law. And churches, I acknowledge, simply fill a gap that the government consti-
tutionally cannot. Id. at 813-14.
214. A privatization theorist might welcome even inframarginal spending on the deduction,
because at a minimum, such spending reduces the size of government. But this would be a
mistake. Treasury money lost through the deduction does not necessarily reduce other
spending programs; the deduction might simply be offset through a higher tax rate. Because
higher marginal tax rates result in greater deadweight loss, GRUBER, supra note 131, at 594-
95, this is a bad outcome even for the privatization advocate: government is no smaller, and
society is poorer. 
215. One might think that reducing duplicative services should be a social gain. But the
government services exist because voters did not want the quantity or kind of services the
charity offers. By changing the government’s choices, lobbying reduces welfare for those
voters. For example, parochial school parents may vote to lower public school quality, which
obviously is not welfare increasing for public school families. Cf. id. at 295-97.
216. In theory nonprofit law could respond to this problem by reducing the amount of the
subsidy directed to organizations whose donors are more likely to be inframarginal, but that
solution has serious practical problems. See Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J.
PUB. ECON. 469, 471 (1995).
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temptation of political power would corrupt churches.217 Modern
commentators echo that concern for the nonprofit sector in general,
worrying that managers will bargain away aspects of their own
goals in exchange for greater power or money to achieve others, or
to pay off hold-ups by officials who want their support.218 Because
independence from majoritarian government decisions is key to all
the rationales for the deduction,219 this problem is an existential
threat to the sector.220 It is especially perilous when combined with
the problem of agency costs. Managers may trade their organiza-
tion’s goals for personal advancement or their own ideological aims,
and most stakeholders will be relatively powerless to stop them.221
Even politics that align perfectly with the organization’s mission can
distract managers from their other tasks.222
Some have argued that if these were serious concerns, organiza-
tions would simply self-commit not to engage in politics.223 In fact,
217. MADISON, supra note 144, at 82-83.
218. Chisholm, Politics and Charity, supra note 13, at 338; Clemens, supra note 112, at
215; Steven Rathgeb Smith & Kirsten A. Grønbjerg, Scope and Theory of Government-
Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at
221, 227; Tobin, supra note 13, at 1320-24, 1329-30. 
219. See supra Part II.A-C.
220. Cf. Tobin, supra note 13, at 1337 (arguing that opportunities to campaign would
compromise nonprofit independence).
221. See Jenkins, supra note 69, at 315 (noting that the political interests of managers
“constrain[ ]” their other values). For qualitative evidence of the phenomenon, see Galston,
supra note 13, at 1327-29 (reporting findings of the Filer Commission and other studies
suggesting that increased government control through funding resulted in organizational
agenda shifts to match the relevant government body’s agenda); Frederick C. Harris, Black
Churches and Civic Traditions: Outreach, Activism, and the Politics of Public Funding of
Faith-Based Ministries, in CAN CHARITABLE CHOICE WORK? COVERING RELIGION’S IMPACT ON
URBAN AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL SERVICES 140, 153-54 (Andrew Walsh ed., 2001); and Debra C.
Minkoff & Walter W. Powell, Nonprofit Mission: Constancy, Responsiveness, or Deflection?,
in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 591, 595-98.
The role of managers also explains why, contrary to Buckles, supra note 13, at 1094, the
Establishment Clause does not mitigate the temptation problem for churches. Although the
government cannot easily give direct rewards to churches, nothing in the First Amendment
prevents political actors from rewarding church officers, especially if the reward is paid out
through policy success or prestige rather than cash. See, e.g., Harris, supra, at 153-54.
222. See Ellen P. Aprill, Lessons from the UBIT Debate, 45 TAX NOTES 1105, 1108 (1989)
(making this point about the rule against substantial commercial activity); cf. Eleanor Brown
& Al Slivinski, Nonprofit Organizations and the Market, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 140, 149-50 (noting that commercial activities divert
scarce organization resources). 
223. See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 13, at 1096; cf. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 25-27 (1995) (suggesting that shareholders can
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any 501(c)(3)’s organizational documents prohibit electioneering or
substantial lobbying, because that is a requirement for eligibility.224
But few nonprofits would self-limit if they were not required to do
so. Many nonprofits compete in the policy arena with other firms;
why would they unilaterally disarm?225 Drafting, monitoring, and
enforcing individualized contractual terms is also expensive.226
What is more, organizational resources and the government’s
subsidy dollars are commons shared by the firm’s founders and their
successors. Thus, each stakeholder with influence over the firm
actually has incentives to divert organizational resources to their
own ends before other managers do so.227 Though these tragedies of
the commons are pervasive, not many resolve themselves without
government assistance; why nonprofits would be different is not
obvious.228 Among other problems, the benefits of solving the col-
lective action problem are good for the firm in the long run, but
present managers will not be around to collect those benefits; they
therefore are prone to overweight their own present opportunities
for rents.229 Endowment effects, framing, and over-optimistic belief
in the founders’ own ability to avoid problems may contribute to this
contract with management to prevent unwanted political activities).
224. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3) (2012).
225. Cf. Hines et al., supra note 148, at 1195-96 (discussing competition among nonprofits).
226. See Hsu, supra note 73, at 125 (“[P]rohibitive transaction costs of cooperation ...
include the costs of enforcement.”).
227. Cf. Barry R. Weingast et al., The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A
Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 658-59 (1981) (explaining
the incentives of public officials to spend expected revenues before other officials use them
up).
228. Hsu, supra note 73, at 125. Scholars of the commons problem report many instances
in which small communities have used norms and other forms of interpersonal commitment
to constrain overuse of common resources. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-37, 88-89, 205-07 (1990); Robert C.
Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1390-91 (1993). But these kinds of
interactions cannot easily arise when the players are spread across time rather than space;
there is no ready sanction of shaming or exclusion that today’s managers can use to punish
future managers. 
229. Cf. Gary A. Wagner, Political Control and Public Sector Savings: Evidence from the
States, 109 PUB. CHOICE 149, 150 (2001) (finding this effect among state officials); Michael
Wolkoff, An Evaluation of Municipal Rainy Day Funds, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., June 1987,
at 52, 61 (articulating the same point with regard to municipal officials). See generally
GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF SUCCESSIVE MOTIVATIONAL
STATES WITHIN THE PERSON 63-80 (1992) (describing evidence that humans excessively
discount future benefits).
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miscalculation.230 Participants may also worry that they will
unfairly be bound by any shared commitment to refrain when others
get away with cheating.231 This seems like a reasonable concern for
nonprofits, for whom oversight by outsiders is particularly diffi-
cult.232
In this respect, organizational self-commitments against lobbying
are similar to more general constraints on managerial self-dealing.
It is possible some organizations would write such rules themselves.
Because of the higher transaction costs a diffuse group of members
faces in organizing to limit the behavior of their agents, however,
default rules should in general be set to protect members against
opportunistic manager behavior.233
B. Economies 
On the other side of the ledger, there are some clear and well-
recognized cost advantages of combining lobbying and charity to-
gether in one organization. I will argue, though, that this cost
advantage may actually cut against nonprofit politics, as it exagger-
ates some of the dangers I have already mentioned.
1. Cost Advantages of Combined Activities
Staff who are already expert in delivering charitable services are
likely to be particularly knowledgeable lobbyists. They have direct
experience serving their target population, have learned close-up
the key problems or issues facing their clientele, and may have
hard-earned information about which solutions work and which do
not.234 Nonprofit staff can also help government to coordinate its
230. Cf. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 256-62 (2000) (discussing the influence of these factors in an
individual’s miscalculation of common natural resources).
231. See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 73, at 127-28.
232. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
233. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 130, at 103-04 (making this point about for-profit
shareholders).
234. See Mayer, supra note 47, at 539 (noting the benefits of interest groups include the
ability to supply “valuable information and advice to governmental decision makers”).
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efforts with their own, perhaps avoiding wasteful duplication or
allowing one program to build on the strengths of another.235
Sharing personnel between lobbying and direct charitable
activities also makes for more effective lobbying. Obviously, expert
lobbyists are often more credible. Beyond that, though, shared staff
may be more cost-effective lobbyists because of warm glow and
personal connection to the organization’s mission.236 Although this
warm glow would presumably dissipate for some workers if they had
to spend all of their time lobbying, a charity could attract top talent
at bargain prices and then “lend” such talent to its lobbying efforts
on a part-time basis.
More generally, overlapping lobbying and charity allows each
activity to leverage the resources that staff and supporters have
contributed for one purpose to the service of the other. Some are
fairly tangible, such as office space, e-mail and phone lists, and well-
trained volunteers.237 Others are more abstract. For example, polit-
ical theorists believe that a key source of lobbyist influence is the
threat, often implicit, that the lobbyist can mobilize her constitu-
ency to vote against the official she is lobbying, or at least to
contribute to the official’s political opposition.238 A charity offers the
lobbyist a built-in grassroots constituency she can use in this way,
saving her—and, if she is subsidized, the government—the costs of
building a separate organization.239
Relatedly, a long-established charity likely has a substantial store
of goodwill and public reputation it can use to sway officials or rally
235. The tax definition of lobbying excludes testimony or simple responses to legislative
inquiries, I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(B) (2006), which allows a fair amount of information to flow
between lobbyists and legislators irrespective of other limits. 
236. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
237. Leff, supra note 13, at 707-08 (discussing the fact that an “organization may use
expenditures made with subsidized funds to support its campaign-intervention activities, but
without making any marginal expenditures”). On the usefulness of voter lists, see Stephen
K. Medvic, Political Management and the Technological Revolution, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF POLITICAL MANAGEMENT 98, 104, 108 (Dennis W. Johnson ed., 2009). 
238. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 12; JEFFREY M. BERRY & CLYDE WILCOX,
THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 90-94 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the influence of nonfinancial
and financial support by PACs and interest groups).
239. See Kenneth T. Andrews & Bob Edwards, Advocacy Organizations in the U.S. Political
Process, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 489-90 (2004) (describing studies that argue for the
importance of preexisting resources and membership for successful advocacy groups); Jenkins,
supra note 69, at 319 (discussing the importance of effective mobilization by advocacy groups
and suggesting ways to achieve it).
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the public behind a lobbying campaign.240 Donors may prefer to
purchase both charity and lobbying from the same organization,
because they have invested effort in verifying the quality or
trustworthiness of that entity.241 Perhaps lobbying organizations
could build similar reputations, but presumably that would be a
long and expensive process. And perhaps lobbying organizations,
standing alone, could never equal the influence of charities. Many
charities can draw on a long tradition of relative nonpartisanship,
as well as the broad social consensus in favor of charity, giving them
special weight when they choose to speak.242 Of course, if that is an
important factor, it suggests that charities and their subsidizers
should want to limit the sector’s political adventures, lest it spend
down its hard-won store of public goodwill. 
Finally, combining what might otherwise be two or more sets of
organizations allows for economies of scale as well as scope.243 If
donors would tend to split contributions to charities and lobbying
firms, or if either half of the combined entity can attract donors that
the other could not, then the whole will be greater than either of its
two parts. Donors may also give more when they know that their
dollars will benefit from economies of scope.244 Additionally, many
charities have very significant sources of revenue independent of
donors. For example, hospitals derive less than 5 percent of their
revenues, on average, from donations.245 
2. The Downside of Cost Advantages
At the same time that economies of scale and scope may benefit
donors to lobbying charities, they may also threaten to create yet
more social headaches or to exacerbate problems I have already
identified. First, and probably most importantly, the two economies
240. Mayer, supra note 47, at 535-36.
241. Cf. Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated
Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1984) (noting that having multiproduct sellers allows
consumers to save on search costs).
242. See Tobin, supra note 13, at 1319-20.
243. Economies of scale are simply savings that result from producing goods in quantity.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 590 (9th ed. 2009).
244. See MARWELL & OLIVER, supra note 179, at 61-63.
245. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40919, AN
OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 19 fig.5, app. at 60 (2009).
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magnify the political power of wealthy donors. As other commenta-
tors have recognized, because of the upside-down nature of § 170,
letting donors who wish to lobby tap into the charitable contribution
deduction would direct a larger government matching grant to
donors who are already rich and politically powerful.246 If combining
the two activities in fact is cost effective, the inequality of the
subsidies would be magnified even further.247 Low-income donors
would benefit from the dollar-multiplying effect of economies of
scale and scope, but those who can afford to donate more would also
see that advantage multiplied, potentially further crowding out the
voices of the less powerful.248
Greater returns on lobbying expenditures also heighten the
danger of capture and entanglement for charities. As charities be-
come more potent tools for effecting political change, political actors’
incentives for influencing, and even co-opting, charity grow.249
Donors with only tenuous connections to the mission of the organi-
zation may also seek to purchase a portion of the surplus created by
the economies of scale and scope, making more plausible the
possibility, which I alluded to in Part III.A.5, that lobbying can
become a distracting profit center for the firm.
Further, the problems of inframarginality and agency costs grow
when nonprofit lobbying becomes more cost effective. The better
charities are at driving down government competition, the less
necessary the subsidy for charity becomes—and the less genuine the
competition between the two sectors. Managers, like the tenuously
connected donors of the last paragraph, are also more tempted to
use the organization’s resources for their own ends when those
resources are a better bargain than spending the managers’ own
money. 
Money derived from interest on an endowment or fees paid by
customers can be yet more tempting for managers than donated
246. See Tobin, supra note 13, at 1326-27; see also supra notes 96-101 and accompanying
text.
247. As I noted earlier, and will take up again later, this problem can also be addressed
with campaign finance regulations or caps on organizational spending. See supra Part II.A.2
and infra Part IV.B.
248. Again, it is worth noting that the crowd-out result depends to some extent on the
shape of the marginal-returns-on-lobbying curve. See supra Figure 1 and text accompanying
note 102. 
249. See Tobin, supra note 13, at 1322.
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funds. As I argued earlier, even donors who are relatively attentive
to the uses of their contributions may have difficulty detecting when
managers’ political choices begin to stray from the donors’ own.250
Hospital patients and museumgoers have no authority over the
board, have strong incentives to free ride on other monitors, and
have no legal authority over nonprofit managers’ political choices,
giving managers with access to the revenue streams a freer hand to
pursue their own personal or ideological interests. 
Taken to an extreme, managerial lobbying threatens the mean-
ingfulness of the firm’s supposed nonprofit status, especially in
firms with significant nondonative revenue. The nondistribution
constraint—that is, the promise that a nonprofit will remain not-for-
profit—is supposed to assure customers that managers will not cut
corners on quality in order to line their own pockets.251 As Henry
Hansmann argues, customers cannot observe or easily measure that
quality. Thus, without the promise of limited profiteering, custom-
ers would likely be unwilling to contract with the firm.252 If,
however, managers can lawfully derive personal consumption from
the firm’s funds, they will again have incentives to shortchange
customers on quality in order to maximize their opportunity to
spend on their own goals. In other words, lobbying can become
profits in disguise. 
To some extent “profits in disguise” are always a possibility when
revenue-driven organizations carry out some functions that please
the firm’s employees but do not fully satisfy customers.253 Nonprofit
law does prohibit organizations from devoting resources to the
private goals of their managers.254 But no rule prevents managers
from shifting resources from one permissible public purpose to
another. If lobbying were permissible, managers could freely spend
customers’ money on lobbying, rather than on quality services. As
250. See supra notes 79-83, 159-64 and accompanying text.
251. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
497, 501 (1981).
252. See id. at 506-07.
253. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 463 (1996); cf.
Mayer, supra note 117, at 109-11 (describing ways in which management may be able to resist
the preferences of consumers, but claiming that it is a good outcome because it preserves the
charity’s public benefit goals). 
254. I.R.C. § 4958 (2006).
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I argued earlier, lobbying is especially likely to create these
opportunities for managerial rent taking.255
Finally, economies of scope and scale also worsen the problem of
regulatory mismatch. Recall that subsidizing lobbying contributions
probably increases crowding in the political marketplace, which
implies that sticks are more likely to be the better choice than
carrots for charitable contributions.256 Suppose that it were possible
for donors to earmark their contributions for the two purposes very
clearly, that firms could not shift money around to offset that ear-
marking, and that government could perfectly monitor uses of the
earmarked funds. The two functions could then be combined in one
firm, and the two different regulatory tools could be applied to the
two different kinds of donations, without much conflict. Economies
from combining the two into one firm would spoil that utopia, how-
ever, because contributions to the charity side of the house would
also allow for more lobbying output per dollar spent on lobbying.
Lobbying donors might be taxed, and so might donate less, but each
dollar would go farther, contributing to crowding. 
C. Summary
Overall, combining politics and charity together in one organiza-
tion looks like it would seriously water down the benefits of the
nonprofit sector. Together, the two can reduce the efficacy of social
incentives for charitable behavior, increase the costs of monitoring
the resulting organization, distort its outputs, and perhaps degrade
their quality. That savings can be found, too, may simply worsen
these problems, because the savings make the combined form espe-
cially tempting for politically motivated donors and managers. 
It could be argued that we should simply leave to donors the
decision whether, on net, combined organizations are worth their
costs.257 Indeed, as I have mentioned, one of the stated goals of the
255. See supra notes 79-83, 159-64 and accompanying text.
256. See supra Part III.A.3.
257. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 14, at 61; Mark Totten, The Politics of Faith:
Rethinking the Prohibition on Political Campaign Intervention, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 298,
307 (2007); cf. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 223, at 25-27 (making this argument about for-
profit firms). 
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deduction is to permit private decisions about the most effective way
to get things done.258
The problem, again, is externalities. Many of the costs of com-
bined entities are borne mostly by people who are not their donors.
Damage to the independence and zest of the sector, political
crowding, reduced warm glow, decreased marginal efficacy of the
government’s subsidy dollars, and increased monitoring effort by the
government—all of these burden the entire charitable sector, if not
all of society.259 Even donors’ agency costs are an externality, as
individual donors do not directly internalize the increased agency
costs of other donors. Thus donors will be drawn to the combined
form by the fact that it makes their own dollars go further while
neglecting the harms those dollars do.
We could tell much the same story about letting nonprofit man-
agers decide the most efficient organizational structure. Rationally
self-maximizing managers would have little reason to choose sep-
arate firms for lobbying and charity. To the contrary, because
combined organizations probably allow managers more autonomy
and therefore more rents, they likely prefer combinations, all else
equal. 
To be sure, not everyone is a rational self-maximizer who ignores
all externalities, and probably very few of us really are. Again, the
nonprofit sector depends on our collective willingness to do good for
one another. Surely some causes are more important and more
salient to us than others, though. We should not expect the environ-
mental advocate to turn down the most effective instrument for
preserving wetlands because that instrument will result in greater
deadweight loss from taxation.260 The data confirm this intuition,
finding that personal ideology matters in giving; donors give to what
is most important to them.261
258. See supra Part II.B.
259. See supra Part III.A; cf. Hsu, supra note 73, at 110-11.
260. See Gergen, supra note 62, at 1412-14 (suggesting donors do not account for the
negative fiscal externality of deduction).
261. Rene Bekkers & Pamala Wiepking, A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of
Philanthropy: Eight Mechanisms that Drive Charitable Giving, 40 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY
SECTOR Q. 924, 941-42 (2010). Even if the observed variation in giving results from differences
in donor information, see id. at 930-32, not ideological beliefs or other preferences, that would
still support my argument. Donors are unlikely to even be aware of many of the social costs
identified here, and certainly not with the degree of precision needed to compare them
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IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
So far, I have focused on the fairly general question of whether
charitable organizations should also lobby. Translating these
principles into legal rules requires a bit more effort. For example,
even if in the abstract we would prefer that charities not lobby,
defining “lobbying” in practice is difficult, especially in the case of
organizations whose charitable mission is to educate the public—an
activity that looks a lot like lobbying. Another example is the ques-
tion of how far lobbying limits should reach: Should they apply to
the entire organization or just to the use of money the organization
raises through deductible contributions? In the absence of a clear
theory about why we would want to prohibit some kinds of conduct
and not others, these kinds of line-drawing exercises are challeng-
ing, not to mention the fact that the results are often confusing,
frustrating, and hard to predict.262 Now that our theory is clearer,
though, the legal task of definition and administration should be
easier. To illustrate—and also because it might be useful—this Part
plays out some of the more important legal details that follow from
the theory so far.
A. Defining Lobbying
Although the basic meaning of lobbying is straightforward, some
difficult borderline cases do arise. Borderline cases are not necessar-
ily rare or unimportant. If organizations can easily change their
behavior to toggle back and forth across a legal border as necessary,
then what begins as a rare exception can quickly become the norm.
It is therefore worthwhile to consider the limits of what we mean by
“lobbying.” 
My working definition of lobbying to this point has comprised
efforts to achieve outcomes through political rather than private
means. Or, put another way, lobbying seeks to extend an organiza-
tion’s control from the use of its own funds to the direction of
meaningfully against the benefits of contributing.
262. See Tobin, supra note 13, at 1356-58 (noting that unclear rules make IRS enforcement
actions difficult to predict).
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taxpayer dollars. That distinction also matches fairly well my
suggested policy rationales for limiting lobbying by charities.263
Influence over the federal treasury allows organizations to reduce
the inframarginality of donations, and that influence most strongly
tempts the entity and its officers to change their mission in ex-
change for greater resources. The scramble to leverage the govern-
ment’s scarce resources may generate resentment towards and
political friction for the nonprofit sector, and regulating that
scramble may require tools that would be incompatible with tools
for encouraging the private production of public goods. 
This logic suggests two significant legal implications, one of which
is contrary to current law. For one, notwithstanding existing IRS
regulations authorizing administrative lobbying,264 lobbying limits
should extend to efforts to influence regulations. Admittedly,
§ 501(c)(3)’s plain text focuses on “propaganda” or other efforts to
affect “legislation.”265 Many regulations have long been held to be
the equivalent of “law” for most purposes,266 though, and the term
“propaganda” on its face is broad enough to include administrative
lobbying. As a policy matter, regulation can direct the uses of pub-
lic resources as effectively as legislation,267 raising the dangers of
distraction, agency costs, warm glow diminishment, and inframar-
ginality. Although the size of most agencies is not usually constitu-
tionally limited, the size of bureaucracies is practically determined
by their budgets,268 so their time and attention, like a legislature’s,
are subject to crowding. Routine interactions with low-level bureau-
crats may not raise these concerns as sharply, and so perhaps, as
Mayer proffers, lobbying might be restricted only when contacts are
with the political leadership of an agency.269
263. See supra Part III.A.
264. Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(d)(3) (1990).
265. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
266. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 493-570 (2002).
267. See id. at 546-48.
268. See Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 834-36 (1994) (describing the importance of agency
budgets as a control mechanism); Charles Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton
Administration and Congressional Procedure, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 212-14 (1998) (same).
269. Mayer, supra note 47, at 554.
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My analysis also suggests, consistent with existing law, that
efforts to sway the outcome of ballot initiatives and referenda are
lobbying.270 Again, there is some linguistic ambiguity in whether
these kinds of law making would fall within the literal ambit of the
terms “propaganda” or “legislation.” Again, too, it is clear that when
voters control government outcomes directly there are significant
opportunities for nonprofit involvement to lead to temptation, infra-
marginality, and politicization.271 A number of studies also confirm
that voter attention in advance of a referendum, as well as tools for
reaching voters—such as television advertising time—are scarce
resources,272 so the crowding arguments are still important. On the
other hand, the agency cost problem is likely less than when non-
profits lobby government directly, because unlike a phone call, back-
room meeting, or handshake agreement, the organization’s efforts
at changing public opinion cannot easily be hidden from its stake-
holders. But on balance the policy case for regulating charitable
involvement in direct democracy still seems quite strong.
Direct democracy does raise more sharply an issue that all
lobbying restrictions face: how to identify when communications
aimed at the general public, rather than directly at policymakers,
should count as lobbying. Under current law, this form of grassroots
lobbying can sometimes count as the equivalent of a direct commu-
nication.273 Whether any given communication counts as lobbying
depends on a set of balancing tests, with the exact content of the
test varying depending on which of several possible legal regimes
the organization is subject to.274
Because public opinion is a key lever for moving government
officials, at least some grassroots communications must count as
lobbying for any lobbying limits to be meaningful. As popular
opinion changes, democratically accountable officials are likely to
270. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008). But see Mayer, supra note 47,
at 562 (arguing that efforts to influence referenda should not be regulated as lobbying). 
271. See supra Part III.A.
272. See Shaun Bowler et al., Ballot Propositions and Information Costs: Direct Democracy
and the Fatigued Voter, 45 W. POL. Q. 559 (1992); Stephen P. Nicholson, The Political
Environment and Ballot Proposition Awareness, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 403, 403-04 (2003); see
also Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845,
1870-72 (1999) (arguing to this effect).
273. Vladeck, supra note 3, at 326-27.
274. See HOPKINS, supra note 35, at 640-61.
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change positions, too, making grassroots lobbying a powerful, if
indirect, tool for accomplishing social change.275 Charitable organi-
zations are key players in developing public opinion because
rationally ignorant voters often rely on credible intermediaries for
their information.276 Organizations’ advertising and other political
communications can also manipulate the framing and emotional
content of a political message to shape voter opinion.277
Interest groups’ power to shape opinion calls into question the
current definition of grassroots lobbying, which is limited to com-
munications that urge the public to contact an official.278 Direct
contact between officials and the public is important but is not the
only pathway to grassroots influence. Officials do often depend on
their contacts with lobbyists or more active constituents to get a
sense of their constituency’s leanings.279 But given the efficacy of
interest groups’ messaging to their constituents, officials can also
get a general sense of possible shifts in public opinion simply by
observing the communications from the organization to the public.
That makes most grassroots lobbying a kind of indirect message to
officials.
Even grassroots lobbying aimed only at members of the organiza-
tion or those with close ties to it can impact officials’ decisions.280 As
I have mentioned, lobbyists derive a good measure of their power
275. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 149-51, 162-63
(2d ed. 1995) (describing how the use of public communications influences officials); James A.
Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 543, 557-60 (1995) (reporting
authors’ evidence that electoral constraints tie officials to public preferences).
276. See Christopher Weber et al., It’s All in the Name: Source Cue Ambiguity and the
Persuasive Appeal of Campaign Ads, 34 POL. BEHAV. 561 (2012); Richard E. Wagner, Pressure
Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article, 1 PUB. CHOICE 161, 164-67 (1966)
(reviewing MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)).
277. See RICHARD M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION: COMMUNICATION AND
ATTITUDES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 287-359 (4th ed. 2010); Lynda Lee Kaid, Political
Advertising, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 155, 160-75 (Lynda Lee
Kaid ed., 2004) (discussing research on how the content of candidates’ political campaign ads
affects the behavior of voters); Adam F. Simon & Jennifer Jerit, Toward a Theory Relating
Political Discourse, Media, and Public Opinion, 57 J. COMM. 254, 257-58 (2007) (discussing
how political entrepreneurs and journalists use framing to produce public discourse, which
in turn affects the judgment of citizens).
278. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(2) (1990).
279. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 38-39 (1982).
280. Galston, supra note 13, at 1349-50.
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from their ability to whip the individual members of the coalition
they represent.281 Because it is costless for any given lobbyist to
claim that she represents a powerful and easily motivated coalition,
all lobbyists presumably would do so. In order to distinguish
themselves, intermediaries who actually represent real interests
must be able to demonstrate that the troops can be mobilized.282
Calls to action from the organizer to the coalition, even if not public,
are therefore at the heart of effective lobbying. The proposal by
some commentators to exempt from regulation all internal commu-
nications from the organization to its members283 would accordingly
weaken most meaningful lobbying restrictions. 
At the same time, any lobbying regulation regime has to acknowl-
edge that information is a public good separate and apart from any
political consequences.284 Organizations that seek to understand the
world or to share existing understandings with a wider public are
therefore at the core of almost any rationale for a nonprofit sub-
sidy.285 Knowledge, of course, can also motivate the public to change
its mind about what the law should be. Even an objective observer
might therefore have trouble distinguishing lobbying from public
education. And, as courts have recognized, the government officials
who have to make this distinction are not always objective.286
Existing law seems to have evolved to a reasonable compromise.
Organizations can escape the lobbying label by following a particu-
lar procedure for how they inform the public.287 Grassroots commu-
nications are not lobbying if they are “educational”—that is, if they
are based in fact, offer contrary evidence when appropriate, and
avoid claims based purely in emotion.288 To be sure, these rules
281. See sources cited supra note 238 and accompanying text.
282. BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 238, at 116-17.
283. See, e.g., Keith S. Blair, Praying for a Tax Break: Churches, Political Speech, and the
Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 405, 435-36 (2008); Mayer,
supra note 47, at 561-62; Totten, supra note 257, at 321-22.
284. See Mayer, supra note 47, at 561.
285. See Chisholm, Matching, supra note 13, at 288.
286. See, e.g., Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1036-37, 1040 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
287. Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729. For a cogent description of the procedure and its
interpretation, see Daniel L. Simmons, An Essay on Federal Income Taxation and Campaign
Finance Reform, 54 FLA. L. REV. 1, 57-64 (2002).
288. Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729; see Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(1) (1990) (stating that
an “independent and objective exposition of a particular subject matter” is “educational” and
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likely allow for a fair amount of what is functionally considered
lobbying under my proposed definition. But the price of being
allowed to lobby is that the organization must often provide society
with genuine public goods—real, honest-to-goodness facts. The
added costs of having to verify its claims and avoid using manipula-
tive advertising serve effectively as taxes on the crowding effects of
the lobbying communication.289
Indeed, current law could probably go further in the direction of
requiring organizations to substantiate their arguments so as to
increase the size of this tax and to heighten the value of the infor-
mation that society receives. For example, the amended rule might
oblige organizations to disclose any reasonable factual evidence
contrary to their public statements, even for statements that do not
include a “call to action.” Studies of deliberation suggest that having
to craft a message that acknowledges opposing opinions would also
have the side benefit of moderating the extremity of an organiza-
tion’s positions.290 That could mitigate the tendency of lobbying
subsidies to polarize the political debate.
B. “Substantial”
From what I have said so far, it should be clear that no test that
seeks to separate lobbying from education is going to be exact. If we
want to avoid deterring a significant amount of activity that could
be close to the line, there should likely be room for organizations to
does not constitute lobbying). Alternatively, grassroots communications are educational if
they simply comment in a roundabout way about legislation without directly calling on the
public to act. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(2) (defining “grassroots lobbying” as com-
munications aimed at the public that identify specific legislation, reflect a view on the
legislation, and encourage recipients to take appropriate action). I argued earlier that this
standard is probably too loose.
289. There is an analogy here to tax shelter regulation. Government often restricts socially
wasteful tax sheltering activity by imposing formal requirements that must be met before the
shelterer can prevail—what David Weisbach calls “backflip[s].” David A. Weisbach, Ten
Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222-23 (2002). Weisbach’s point is that
meeting the formal requirements is itself wasteful for the shelterer, so it is ambiguous
whether such requirements actually improve total welfare on net. Id. In the case of the
education requirements, though, the backflip also produces a public good, making it rather
more likely that the distortive effect of the educational requirement actually betters society
overall. 
290. See Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 109. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY
SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 209-13 (2003).
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make some mistakes before they are seriously penalized. That
brings us to the question of how much lobbying activity should be
permissible. Historically, courts have refused to revoke an organiza-
tion’s 501(c)(3) status for conducting nonexempt activities unless
those activities were “substantial.”291 Congress has now codified the
substantiality rule for lobbying.292 More recently, Congress has also
added penalties short of revocation for certain kinds of organiza-
tions.293 
Both of these approaches make sense as ways of balancing the
deterrence of grassroots lobbying against the encouragement of edu-
cation. Balancing can also make sense even in the case of direct
communications with officials because society will often want gov-
ernment to use the knowledge gathered by nonprofits. 
Although my theory here does not by itself tell us exactly where
to draw the line that constitutes too much lobbying, it does at least
help to clarify how to go about drawing that line. Most commenta-
tors assume that the portion of the organization’s time or resources
devoted to lobbying determines whether its lobbying is “substan-
tial.”294 For example, observers of the Mormon Church’s multimil-
lion dollar efforts in support of Proposition 8 in California suggested
that even $10 million in expenditures would be a tiny fraction of the
Church’s annual revenues, and so were not “substantial.”295
This view of “substantial” is too narrow to fit with most justifica-
tions for the lobbying limits. As I have argued in abbreviated form
elsewhere, substantial lobbying should likely also include efforts
that have a significant real-world policy impact, even if as small as
a fraction of an organization’s budget.296 Almost all of the rationales
for lobbying limits make more sense if they are measured by
291. Galle, supra note 106, at 372-73.
292. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
293. Id. § 4955. Private foundations are always subject to monetary penalties for some
kinds of political activity. Id. § 4945(d). Most public charities, other than churches, can also
opt in to an intermediate sanction regime. Id. § 501(h). The opt-in is attractive because it also
expressly limits when organizations can lose their exemption. Vladeck, supra note 3, at 322-
23.
294. See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 35, at 642-43.
295. Janet I. Tu, Mormon Church’s Role in Prop. 8 Fight Debated, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 14,
2008, at A12; John D. Columbo, LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Lobbying Limitation,
NONPROFIT L. PROF BLOG (Nov. 18, 2008), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2008/
11/lds-church-prop.html.
296. See Galle, supra note 106, at 374-79.
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lobbying’s real policy impact. For example, an organization’s total
expenditures, not the fraction of its budget spent on lobbying, de-
termine how much it congests the political market.
Consider also the temptation, warm glow, and entanglement
issues. A charity willing to shape legislative outcomes single
handedly is going to be an important political player. Officials will
often put considerable pressure on the managers to conform to the
politicians’ views, and managers will be sorely tempted to use their
power for their own goals.297 Similarly, public perceptions of char-
ities as political rather than charitable are likely to depend on the
organization’s impact on the political scene. If the Gates Foundation
decided to spend $500 million to push for a carbon tax, it is doubtful
that any view of them as partisan would be dampened by the fact
that the Foundation still had another $39.5 billion to throw around. 
Even the arguments that critics of the lobbying limits offer seem
to counsel for limits on a charity’s overall policy impact. Recall that
a central problem for the interest representation and political
pluralism claims was that more powerful or traditional interests
could also benefit from the deduction, and their magnified voices
could then crowd out, or even counteract, less influential groups.298
This problem could be curtailed if each organization faced some kind
of cap on its lobbying activities.299 The cap could not increase sig-
nificantly as the size of the entity grew, because if it did, powerful
interests would still be able to drown out others. We thus would
want something like what I have just suggested: a limit, or perhaps
a soft cap along the lines of the luxury tax model common in
professional sports, on the influence any one interest group could
exert. 
297. See id. at 378.
298. See supra Part II.A.2-3.
299. Of course, the limits would have to treat all related entities as a single unit; otherwise
the caps could be easily evaded by creating strings of subsidiaries. Cf. Donald B. Tobin,
Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing,
10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 444 (2011) (noting need for antiabuse rules if regulations are based on
the amount of donations to an organization).
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C. Donations or Organizations?
Although current law is clear that limits on lobbying apply to all
of a § 501(c)(3) organization’s activities, no matter the source of the
funds expended, several commentators argue that this interpreta-
tion is mistaken.300 For example, Laura Chisholm argues that the
rationale for the limitations should apply only to donations that
have benefitted from the government’s subsidy.301 According to
Chisholm, revenues from other sources, such as paying customers,
or presumably even nondeductible contributions, should not face
any limits.302 Her claim, essentially, is that the only reason to limit
lobbying is to prevent government subsidies from supporting polit-
ical activities.303 Thus, organizations should be able to spend their
unsubsidized funds freely. These kinds of arguments sidestep the
economies of scope and scale issues304 but otherwise seem reason-
able given their premise.
But what if the purpose of the lobbying limits is much broader
than simply cordoning off the government’s subsidy? The disecon-
omy of scope rationales I have offered,305 if persuasive, require that
lobbying limits apply to the entire organization. Nearly all of the
diseconomies result from the simple fact that the two purposes are
conducted by a single organization. Whether lobbying dollars are
subsidized by the government does not affect whether monitoring
costs are higher, whether warm glow diminishes, or whether the
inframarginality of the deduction declines. 
Indeed, lobbying in firms that do not depend much on subsidized
donations also suggests a more fundamental challenge to the
rationale of the Citizens United antiregulatory regime. The premise
of Citizens United appears to be that spending by organizations
represents political expression by the organization’s members,
300. See Chisholm, Politics and Charity, supra note 13, at 328, 352; Totten, supra note 257;
see also Buckles, supra note 13, at 1122-23 (suggesting government could achieve its purpose
by recapturing the economic value of deductible contributions spent on politics).
301. Chisholm, Politics and Charity, supra note 13, at 352.
302. See id. at 328.
303. See id. at 352.
304. That is, they neglect the possibility that any subsidy for the organization could benefit
all of its activities, even those not funded directly. See Leff, supra note 13, at 707-08; Volokh,
supra note 43, at 1942-43.
305. See supra Part III.A.
2013] CHARITIES IN POLITICS 1623
shareholders, and donors.306 The money that the entity spends, the
Court assumes, is a proxy for speech by its financial supporters.307
As others have noted, that assumption is problematic in most
nonprofits, where monitoring and oversight of managers who make
spending decisions is sporadic and weakly enforced.308 The Court
itself had at one time recognized that the speech-proxy assumption
is especially improbable for organizations with revenues not derived
from donations.309 When hospitals lobby, they are not focusing the
pooled time and money of a community of like-minded individuals;
they are spending a portion of fees from paying customers. 
The same is true of most for-profit firms. But at least directors of
those firms are, in theory, bound by their obligations to sharehold-
ers who can vote them out of office or, in some states, bring suit for
breach of duty. Many revenue-supported nonprofits have no mem-
bers at all; their boards are “self-perpetuating,” subject only to the
choices of the existing members of the board.310 If the board or the
officers breach their duties, they often can be sued only by the entity
itself, another board member, or the attorney general of the state.311
Therefore the assumption that revenue-rich nonprofit corporations’
speech is the product of stakeholder “democracy” seems especially
thin.
V. ELECTIONEERING
At this point, having read so much about lobbying, the reader
may have forgotten that charities also face a nominal ban on any
involvement in campaigns for public office. Fortunately, much of
what I have said about lobbying also applies to the electioneering
ban, in many cases even more so. 
To review, the ban on electioneering permits the IRS to revoke
exemption for any participation in a campaign for elected office,
306. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904-08 (2010).
307. See id. at 899, 904, 911 (describing an entity’s communications as “speech” controlled
by shareholder “democracy”).
308. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 86, at 1044-45.
309. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
310. Brody, supra note 253, at 466-67.
311. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 324-28 (2004).
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however insubstantial.312 In reality, though, the government permits
a fair amount of involvement in campaigns by defining some
campaign-related activities as something other than impermissible
electioneering. For example, organizational leaders can endorse
candidates and identify themselves with the organization, so long
as they are not acting in an “official capacity.”313 Charities can com-
ment on issues that are related to an ongoing campaign, as long as
on balance the issue-related observations are not tied too closely to
candidates.314 Organizations can hold candidate forums on the
condition that the invitation is extended to all major candidates
—even if the organization knows that the candidates who expect to
be booed will not show.315 And a charity can present nonpartisan
voter guides evaluating how officeholders have stood on issues
important to the organization, but only if the organization makes no
particular effort to connect the evaluation to an ongoing cam-
paign.316
My analysis of the previous three Parts suggests these limits are
defensible in both directions—that is, good nonprofit policy reasons
support a limit on substantial electioneering by a charity. There are
also good reasons to have some exceptions to the limits, and the
principles implicit in the exceptions I mentioned are sensible. Or, at
least, they would be sensible if the funding stream for nonprofits
were more transparent. Each of these points needs a bit more expla-
nation.
A. Defending the Electioneering Ban
In many ways the case against combining charity and electoral
politics is stronger than the case against nonprofit lobbying. For one
thing, as earlier commentators have recognized, the connection
between electioneering and the purposes of the deduction is
attenuated.317 Electing sympathetic candidates can be one way for
312. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
313. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
314. See id.
315. Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73.
316. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
317. See Chisholm, Politics and Charity, supra note 13, at 349-50; Tobin, supra note 13, at
1337-38.
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a coalition to “get stuff,” including public goods. The promise of
electoral support can be a lever to strengthen lobbying efforts.318 But
in the American duopolistic political system, candidates run on
broad slates of many issues bundled together.319 Electing a candi-
date who will produce more of one good in the bundle may also
mean less of many of the others, reducing net utility per subsidy
dollar for both donors and their opponents. Further, bundling
implies that government subsidy dollars will often be on both sides
of an election, which hardly seems like the most efficient way to use
tax dollars for the production of public goods.320
Public support for campaign contributions might give more voice
to poorer voters, but as with lobbying, the design of the charitable
contribution deduction is ill fitted to that purpose. Proponents of
campaign contribution subsidies favor vouchers in a fixed amount,
often in combination with caps on individual and corporate contribu-
tions.321 Others recommend tax credits but only with a very low cap
on the available credit.322 As all of these commentators recognize,
with unlimited matching, public support could simply be hijacked
by already-powerful interests who would use the money to further
entrench their own influence.323
Several diseconomies of scope also seem worse in the electioneer-
ing context. Agency problems are more severe because of the issue-
bundling problem. An organization’s mission could encompass
issues that do not line up perfectly with candidate positions, leaving
the entity’s managers freedom to choose which issues and candi-
dates to favor. The Catholic Bishops Association’s apparent electoral
318. See Simon et al., supra note 14, at 288, 298 n.86.
319. The IRS has pointed to this difference as a reason to distinguish between lobbying and
electioneering, although without any particularly deep explanation as to why the difference
matters. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969).
320. Cf. Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann, Conclusion: The Permanent Campaign
and the Future of American Democracy, in THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE 219,
225 (Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann eds., 2000) (contrasting “zero-sum” expenditures
on campaigns with constructive use of resources spent achieving policy).
321. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 14 (2002); Thomas Cmar, Toward a Small Donor Democracy: The Past
and Future of Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
443, 449-50 (2005); Hasen, supra note 18, at 20-27. 
322. See de Figueiredo & Garrett, supra note 101, at 640-43, 661-66; Overton, supra note
98, at 107-08.
323. See, e.g., de Figueiredo & Garrett, supra note 101, at 644-45.
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preference for candidates who focus on reproduction and family
structure, rather than those who accord with the Church’s views on
immigration and poverty, is one of many possible prominent ex-
amples.324 Of course, managers might well choose the exact balance
that contributors would, but given the challenges of effective
monitoring, they will also face temptations to choose based on self-
serving factors.325
Electioneering also may exacerbate the effects of politics on warm
glow. Electioneering seems more likely than lobbying to send a
signal that managers are self-serving. Candidates generally rep-
resent a broader array of interests than any one issue organization.
There are therefore greater opportunities for supporters of a can-
didate to free ride, so that a rational observer would conclude that
campaign contributors are more likely pursuing some purely self-
serving interest. Indeed, the literature on campaign contributions
suggests that to overcome the free-rider problem, candidates strive
to create private benefit for their donors.326 The broader array of
positions a candidate takes also increases the chance that the
charity’s choice will contradict the preferences of some of its poten-
tial donors.327 More generally, voters seem to have a limited toler-
ance for political advertising, in part because they seem to resent
the culture of bargained exchange it represents.328
This latter point suggests that combined charity and electioneer-
ing entities also present a regulatory mismatch problem. Unlike
lobbying, campaign expenditures are not aimed at a small group of
people whose composition is limited by the Constitution and whose
staff resources are limited. So there is not a crowd-out problem in
324. See Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: Have American Churches
Failed to Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW. 29, 49-55
(2004).
325. See supra Part III.A.5.
326. See TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL
DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS 222-23 (1980); Jenkins, supra note 69, at 319. See
generally WALKER, supra note 184, at 46 (examining motivations for interest group
participation). 
327. Cf. Tobin, supra note 13, at 1338-39 (noting that supporting political candidates might
make fundraising more difficult for charities).
328. See Cmar, supra note 321, at 446-47; Hsu, supra note 73, at 109; see also Thomas
Stratmann, Some Talk: Money in Politics. A (Partial) Review of the Literature, 124 PUB.
CHOICE 135, 137 (2005) (summarizing evidence that voters distrust messages paid for by
“special interests”).
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the same sense. But campaign expenditures do seem to give rise to
other negative externalities. One, as I just mentioned, is that as
expenditures rise, their marginal efficacy diminishes because of
public campaign fatigue. Additionally, when one side in a campaign
spends, the other side usually must respond or lose.329 So spending
by either side has a double-negative effect, both triggering an arms
race and also upping the cost of effective competition in the race.
Whether there are any strong positive externalities associated with
most campaign spending remains unclear; many campaign ads are
aimed at viewer emotions and offer little new informational con-
tent.330 The optimal price instrument for campaign spending,
therefore, is probably a stick, not the carrot that charities currently
collect. 
B. Defending Exceptions to the Electioneering Ban
On the other hand, charities can play a socially important role in
gathering and sharing information about public officials. As is well
known, interest groups allow voters to overcome their individual
rational ignorance of politics, mainly through the device of agents
who are paid to collect that information and share it with the
group.331 Of course group members also attempt to free ride on
329. See Mark Paul Gius, An Analysis of the 2006 Congressional Elections: Does Campaign
Spending Matter?, 15 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 703, 705 (2010); see also Cmar, supra note 321,
at 443-44 (noting an “overwhelming correlation between fundraising success and electoral
victory”). As is well known, there are serious endogeneity problems—that is, possible reverse-
causality issues—with measuring the effects of spending on campaign outcomes; for example,
being perceived as the likely winner can attract donations. See Stratmann, supra note 328,
at 138. Modern studies using instrumental variables techniques confirm, though, that
outspending rivals increases electoral success. Kenneth Benoit & Michael Marsh, The
Campaign Value of Incumbency: A New Solution to the Puzzle of Less Effective Incumbent
Spending, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874, 888 (2008). 
330. See TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: HOW EMOTIONAL APPEALS IN
POLITICAL ADS WORK 13-16 (2006); see also Alan S. Gerber et al., How Large and Long-Lasting
Are the Persuasive Effects of Televised Campaign Ads? Results from a Randomized Field
Experiment, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 135, 148-49 (2011) (suggesting their results are more
consistent with the emotional than the informational view of advertising). But see Paul
Freedman et al., Campaign Advertising and Democratic Citizenship, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 723,
725-35 (2004) (arguing that political advertising contains “some” information and that its
emotional content encourages voters to learn more). It is worth noting that the “information”
Freedman et al. find evidence of consists mostly of voters’ ability to name the candidates. Id.
at 729.
331. Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 77, at 1649-50; see Andrews & Edwards, supra note
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others’ willingness to pay their agents. Subsidies for agents who will
monitor government on behalf of the public, or at least on behalf of
a group large enough to experience free riding, therefore make sense
as a way of overcoming market failures. 
Charities are especially well positioned to play this monitoring
role. Their issue-specific expertise allows charitable employees to
gather information about good public policy cheaply, often as a
sideline to their main mission.332 That same expertise, and the at
least nominal loyalty of the charity to its mission, rather than to
outsiders, makes the information it releases especially credible.
Credibility is key to useful information gatherers,333 because it is
easy to imagine that those subject to monitoring would set up bogus
or captive monitors. And the social ties the charity can foster among
those committed to its mission help to ensure that participants also
pay for their share of the added costs of monitoring.334
With these benefits come the now-familiar caveats. Charities’
efficacy at tracking elected officials makes them especially tempting
targets for officials and their foes. Managers, too, might be tempted
to take advantage of the unique position their control of a credible
charity would offer in pursuit of their personal ideology or rewards
from outsiders. 
There may be ways to disentangle the public good from the
private misappropriations of it. A possible dividing line falls be-
tween pure information and active endorsement. One suspects that
those who hijack a charity for their own political ends will rarely be
content with a simple statement of the facts of a candidate’s record.
Instead, the temptation will be to push the audience to draw voting
conclusions from the facts and to leverage the charity’s other re-
sources to spread the combined information and advocacy message.
Drawing the line at some kind of active advocacy therefore rules out
subsidies for many would-be misappropriators. Note also that from
society’s perspective the informational value of a charity’s endorse-
ment is much lower than a simple voter scorecard reporting whether
239, at 498 (explaining the importance of professional staff in monitoring complex modern
regulation).
332. See Yael Tamir, Revisiting the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 214, 223
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
333. See Leff, supra note 13, at 713.
334. See Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 590 (1982).
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a candidate has performed well on the issues that matter to the
charity.335 The charity has expertise related to its own issues. It is
not expert on the separate question of whether on balance the
officeholder has enough other good or bad qualities, relative to the
opposition, to outweigh her performance on the scorecard. 
Many of the current law’s definitions of impermissible electioneer-
ing roughly track this line. Scorecards, candidate fora, and discus-
sions of issues are, as I noted earlier, all currently permissible in
some circumstances and all permit charities to share a significant
amount of their knowledge with the public.336 Each of these activ-
ities then tip into violations when used more directly as advocacy
tools, especially when they seem to allow candidates to make use of
the organization’s financial resources on an unequal basis. The voter
scorecard revenue rulings, for example, emphasize that organiza-
tions that blast out thousands of copies of their card near an election
risk their exempt status.337 Endorsements by leaders acting in their
individual capacity are harder to explain as purely informational,
but at least they do not typically consume much of the entity’s
tangible resources. 
Obviously the exact balance between these interests and the
corresponding line between permissible and impermissible is hard
to state with precision. Information is itself persuasive; that is why
it is valuable to the electorate. Building credibility itself takes a
serious resource commitment. Probably, then, the better approach
would be to mirror the lobbying rules and to more officially recog-
nize that organizations can commit insubstantial missteps without
losing their exemption.338 Existing money penalties for political
expenditures will help discourage abuse of this leeway.339
335. On the significance of scorecards to low-information voters, see L. SANDY MAISEL &
MARK D. BREWER, PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA: THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 133-36 (5th
ed. 2010).
336. See supra notes 331-34 and accompanying text.
337. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154, at Situation 4.
338. See Buckles, supra note 13, at 1077 (suggesting adding a “substantiality” exception
or other intermediate sanctions for electioneering).
339. See I.R.C. §§ 527, 4955, 4958 (2006).
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C. Transparency as a Precondition for the Exceptions
I should note one important qualification to my argument of the
last Section. A key assumption I made was that charities would at
least sometimes genuinely be independent of politicians or their
allies. The problem is that it will not be easy for the public to
observe when that is the case. It is a well-known feature of reputa-
tion markets that, in the absence of some way to credibly sort posers
from objective opinion makers, the market unravels and no one’s
reputation is worth much.340 Technologically savvy readers may
recognize this as the “Yelp” problem: it is hard to tell if someone
with no “user rating” who has reviewed a restaurant is a satisfied
customer or the owner.341 If much of the education offered by char-
ities is not useful to the public, the case for carving out an exception
for “educational” communications appears weak. 
It thus seems crucial that the public have information about who
funds nonprofits that are opining about politics.342 Political sci-
entists report that voters can and do use data about who paid for
a political message to draw inferences about its reliability.343
Obviously, not all donations would have to be made public. The
identity of many small donors is less important than the fact that
they exist at all: widespread public support can serve as evidence for
voters that others believe in the expertise of the organization, just
as user ratings of Yelp reviewers helps to confirm their credibility.
But relatively large donations can clearly impact the objectivity of
the organization, and so that information is properly relevant for
the voting public, under my informational theory.344 
340. That is, unless there is some costly, and therefore credible, signal that objective raters
can offer to separate themselves from the pool of fakers, observers will not be able to
distinguish the two. See Keith Weigelt & Colin Camerer, Reputation and Corporate Strategy:
A Review of Recent Theory and Applications, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 443, 448-49 (1988).
341. For an example of Yelp’s reliability problem, see Jim Handy, Think Yelp is Unbiased?
Think Again!!, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2012, 12:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jimhandy/
2012/08/16/think-yelp-is-unbiased-think-again.
342. But see Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 77, at 1664 (doubting that information about
individual donors would be useful).
343. See, e.g., Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting
Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 63 (1994).
344. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
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I therefore agree, albeit for different reasons, with those who
have called for more transparency in the nonprofit sector.345
Organizations that do not want to avail themselves of the informa-
tion and education safe harbor from the electioneering ban need not
disclose their donors. But any organization that wants to rely on a
claim that it is informing the public should have to acknowledge
who is paying for its information. 
CONCLUSION
Economic theory explains the lobbying limits and electioneering
ban more thoroughly than any prior approach has. Although
subsidies may be justified to overcome collective action problems in
information gathering and political representation for group in-
terests, theory also suggests that extending the charitable contribu-
tion deduction to include politics is a poor design for such a subsidy. 
I have limited my discussion to nonprofit policy, and have not
addressed the Constitution. For example, I do not dispute here the
suggestion that government funding decisions seriously impair
liberty and can only be justified, if at all, by very good reasons.346 I
am instead interested in identifying what those reasons might be. 
My arguments also may counsel for closing the “(c)(4) loophole.”
As I have noted, many charities routinely avoid legal scrutiny of
their political activities by shunting those tasks to an affiliated (c)(4)
organization.347 Given that the boundary between the two firms may
exist only on paper, the multifirm structure will likely not mitigate
many of the diseconomies of scope I have mentioned. Until now it
has appeared that the (c)(4) outlet is constitutionally required.
Permitting the (c)(4) structure, though, merely allows the govern-
ment to escape strict scrutiny.348 If strict scrutiny is inevitable in the
wake of Citizens United, as many commentators believe,349 then the
(c)(4) loophole no longer has any function. Further, given that my
345. E.g., Aprill, supra note 1, at 403-04; Tobin, supra note 299, at 440-44; Ciara Torres-
Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt
Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS
59, 92-93 (2011).
346. E.g., CRIMM & WINER, supra note 69, at 292.
347. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
348. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
349. See supra note 53.
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arguments imply that the existing regulations can potentially
survive strict scrutiny, my arguments also suggest the loophole may
not need to stay open. 
As for free-standing (c)(4)s and other noncharitable nonprofits, at
least some of my analysis also extends to them. Exemption, I have
noted, is a subsidy in the sense that similar U.S. entities would
usually pay taxes on the money used to fund their political expendi-
tures.350 Exemption therefore magnifies the resources wealthier
interests have available for politics and contributes to crowding of
the political marketplace. On the other hand, because it is unclear
whether noncharitable nonprofits get any other subsidy, few of the
diseconomies of scope I have described seem to apply to them,
although some economies do. Thus, my analysis probably prescribes
at least some limits on lobbying and electioneering for these organ-
izations but not a total ban. Electioneering subsidies for nonchar-
itable nonprofits also likely should be accompanied by disclosure
requirements, for the reasons I have described.
350. See supra note 60.
